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ASSORTED ANTI-LEEGIN CANARDS:  
WHY RESISTANCE IS MISGUIDED AND FUTILE 
ALAN J. MEESE
ABSTRACT
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), the Su-
preme Court reversed Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911), which had banned minimum resale price maintenance (“minimum RPM”) as unlaw-
ful per se. For many, Leegin was a straightforward exercise of the Court’s long-recognized 
authority, implied by the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, to adjust antitrust doctrine in light 
of new economic learning. In particular, Leegin invoked the teachings of transaction cost 
economics (“TCE”), which holds that many non-standard agreements, including minimum 
RPM, are voluntary mechanisms that reduce the transaction costs that manufacturers incur 
when they rely upon independent dealers to distribute their goods. For instance, proponents 
of TCE, including Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson, have asserted that minimum RPM 
can prevent free riding and ensure that dealers engage in an optimal amount and type of 
promotion. Invoking these and other possible benefits, the Leegin Court ruled that mini-
mum RPM could produce “redeeming virtues” and thus did not satisfy the normal test for 
per se condemnation. In so doing, the Court adhered to the rule of reason’s requirement, ar-
ticulated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), that courts adjust anti-
trust doctrine when “more accurate economic conceptions” undermine previous decisions. 
 However, some have chosen to resist Leegin to the utmost. In particular, scholars, en-
forcement officials, and forty-one state attorneys general have sought to convince Congress 
and/or state legislatures to reinstate the per se rule by statute, for instance, and have con-
tended that minimum RPM is unlawful per se under existing state antitrust laws. Many 
have also argued that, pending Leegin’s reversal, courts should subject minimum RPM to a 
“quick look” rule of reason, whereby the practice is presumed unlawful, immediately casting 
upon the defendant a burden of justification. Perhaps because of these efforts, legislation 
that would have reversed Leegin and codified Dr. Miles was proposed by Congress in 2011. 
 There is, of course, a long history of Congress overriding straightforward applications of 
the Sherman Act, sometimes at the behest of special interest groups that benefit from such 
exemptions. However, those who resist Leegin and seek to reinstate the per se rule against 
minimum RPM do not rely upon the power of legislatures to pass wealth-reducing legisla-
tion. Instead they argue that Leegin “got it wrong” when applying basic antitrust principles 
animating the rule of reason. For these advocates, then, a new per se ban on minimum RPM 
would merely undo Leegin’s mistake. 
 This article refutes the various arguments that Leegin’s detractors have made for rein-
stating Dr. Miles and/or “quick look” treatment. TCE, it is shown, undermined the central 
premise of the per se rule, namely, that minimum RPM is economically indistinguishable 
from a naked horizontal cartel between dealers. This realization casts upon those who resist 
Leegin a burden of articulating and supporting an alternative rationale for per se condem-
nation. As the Article shows, Leegin’s detractors have not met this burden. Instead, their 
various arguments contradict TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both. Taken to their logical 
conclusion, these arguments would require the Court to abandon decades of jurisprudence 
based upon TCE and/or the long-standing test for per se illegality. However, Leegin’s de-
tractors have offered no argument in favor of such radical changes. 
 Thus, far from correcting Leegin’s purported antitrust error, reimposition of the ban on 
minimum RPM would constitute a rejection of the “more accurate economic conceptions” 
that should drive antitrust doctrine and thus be akin to a welfare-reducing special interest 
 Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor of Law, William and Mary 
Law School. The William and Mary Law School provided a summer research grant in sup-
port of this project. 

908 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW      [Vol. 40:907 
exemption from the Sherman Act. Such exemptions are read narrowly, to minimize the im-
pact of special interest influence in the legislative process. Indeed, even if Congress or the 
states do codify a per se ban on minimum RPM, state and federal courts will have various 
doctrinal strategies at their disposal to minimize the wealth-reducing impact of such legisla-
tion by, for instance, reading any amendment narrowly and restricting the class of plaintiffs 
who can challenge such agreements. As a result, resistance to Leegin may be more than 
merely misguided; it may also be futile. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act bans contractual restraints that are 
“unreasonable” because they exercise market power and reduce eco-
nomic welfare. The “rule of reason” thus requires judges to determine 
whether challenged restraints confer market power or, instead, real-
locate rights and obligations in a manner that creates wealth. How-
ever, most judges are insufficiently conversant with the sort of micro-
economic theory necessary to evaluate the many trade restraints 
potentially subject to Section 1. When implementing the rule of rea-
son, then, generalist judges must rely upon the expertise of others, 
particularly economists and economically sophisticated lawyers and 
legal scholars, about the impact of various restraints upon economic 
welfare. While courts sometimes undertake a “full-blown” analysis to 
determine whether a challenged restraint is “unreasonable,” courts 
declare certain categories of restraints “unreasonable per se.” 
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 It is not surprising, then, that developments in economic science 
should ultimately influence antitrust doctrine. The Congress that 
passed the Sherman Act anticipated that antitrust courts would 
draw upon centuries of common law tradition when developing such 
doctrine. That tradition, in turn, encouraged courts to revise prior 
decisions when changes in “economic conceptions”—what modern 
scholars and judges call “economic theory”—altered judges’ percep-
tion of the impact of such restraints. In the same way, economic theo-
ry has repeatedly informed the “reason” that judges bring to bear 
when adjudicating Section 1 controversies. Thus, decisions from prior 
eras often appear “wrong” to modern eyes because the jurists who 
rendered them were applying theory now deemed erroneous. 
 The last century has provided a case study illustrating this ac-
count of the relationship between economic theory and antitrust doc-
trine. During this period judicial treatment of minimum resale price 
maintenance (“minimum RPM”) and other vertical distributional re-
straints evolved substantially. In 1911, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., the Supreme Court declared minimum 
RPM unreasonable per se, that is, unlawful without regard to a con-
tract’s actual economic effect.1 The Court reasoned that such agree-
ments were equivalent to naked horizontal agreements between 
dealers. Shortly thereafter the Court narrowed this prohibition, an-
nouncing, for instance, that minimum RPM imposed pursuant to 
consignment agreements was subject to a forgiving, full-blown rule of 
reason analysis. Congress, in turn, invited states to immunize most 
minimum RPM under so-called “fair trade” laws, an invitation that 
most states accepted. 
 There matters stood until the 1950s, when courts, influenced by 
neoclassical price theory and its perfect competition model, grew in-
creasingly hostile to partial contractual integration or “non-standard 
contracts,” particularly distributional restraints. This hostility mani-
fested itself in declarations that particular restraints were unreason-
able per se, both because they reduced rivalry between the parties to 
them and, in addition, could not produce redeeming virtues. In so do-
ing, the Court built upon and reaffirmed Dr. Miles. Indeed, by the 
late 1960s, the Court had banned vertical territorial restraints as 
well as maximum resale price maintenance, practices that had previ-
ously merited forgiving rule of reason scrutiny. 
 Just as the scope of antitrust regulation reached its maximum, the 
field of microeconomic theory known as industrial organization expe-
rienced a scientific revolution, in the form of Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics (“TCE”). TCE offered a new theory explaining why reliance on 
1. See 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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atomistic markets to conduct economic activity—transacting—might 
reduce economic welfare. In particular, TCE posited that reliance on 
such markets could impose costs on transacting parties, what practi-
tioners of TCE dubbed “transaction costs.” According to TCE, eco-
nomic actors could reduce such costs by forming new firms or expand-
ing the reach of current firms through complete or partial vertical 
integration. Indeed, according to Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson, 
who pioneered TCE’s advance during the 1970s, TCE established a 
rebuttable presumption that complete and partial integration in the 
form of non-standard contracts could reduce the cost of transacting 
and thereby increase economic welfare. Like other practitioners of 
TCE, Williamson examined distributional restraints, that is, agree-
ments limiting, say, the prices charged by retail dealers or the terri-
tories in which they could operate.  
 TCE has had a profound influence on Section 1 doctrine, which, 
after all, governs a wide universe of non-standard contracts. In 1977, 
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., the Supreme Court 
reversed course, embraced TCE-based arguments, and jettisoned its 
recent ban on vertical territorial restraints.2 In particular, Sylvania
drew upon arguments, first made with respect to minimum RPM, 
that reliance upon independent dealers—the market—to distribute a 
product could lead to suboptimal promotional investments and thus 
market failure, as some dealers might free ride on promotional in-
vestments made by others. Territorial restraints, the Court said, 
could overcome this free riding, ensuring that dealers could capture 
the benefits of their promotional investments and reducing a manu-
facturer’s cost of relying upon the market to distribute its goods. In 
this way, the Court said, such restraints could further “interbrand 
competition,” the primary concern of the antitrust laws. 
 Sylvania signaled a sea change in antitrust jurisprudence; the 
Court would subsequently reverse or narrow previous decisions that 
had declared particular non-standard agreements unreasonable per 
se. This trend culminated in 2007, when, in Leegin, the Supreme 
Court invoked TCE logic to overrule Dr. Miles and declare minimum 
RPM subject to full-blown rule of reason analysis, like the vast ma-
jority of restraints subject to Section 1.3 Like Sylvania, Leegin credit-
ed arguments by numerous proponents of TCE to the effect that, by 
setting minimum resale prices, manufacturers and their dealers can 
overcome various market failures and resulting transaction costs 
that would otherwise occur if dealers were free to charge whatever 
they wished. For instance, the Court opined that minimum RPM 
could ensure that dealers who invest heavily in promoting the manu-
 2. See 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 3. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881. 
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facturer’s product can capture the sales resulting from that invest-
ment, free of rivalry from free-riding dealers that decline to engage in 
promotion and thus charge cut-rate prices. Thus, the Court said, min-
imum RPM could facilitate entry by upstart manufacturers seeking 
to attract established dealers to carry and promote new products and 
also facilitate promotion of more established brands. The Court also 
concluded that manufacturers could employ minimum RPM to guar-
antee dealers a stream of income going forward, thereby making 
termination a meaningful sanction that would deter dealers from 
breaching various contractual obligations, whether or not those obli-
gations were related to promotion. Given the possibility that mini-
mum RPM could produce such benefits, the Court said, Dr. Miles had 
erred in equating manufacturer-induced minimum RPM with naked 
agreements between dealers, with the result that per se condemna-
tion was inappropriate. Although recognizing that Dr. Miles was a 
longstanding precedent, the Court invoked numerous prior decisions 
that had revised or abandoned rulings whose factual premises had 
proven false. 
 Leegin’s straightforward application of TCE should not have been 
controversial. After all, the Court had repeatedly reiterated Sylva-
nia’s transaction cost logic, sometimes in unanimous or near unani-
mous decisions. Indeed, both proponents and detractors of Sylvania
recognized at the time that the decision’s logic would also undermine 
the per se ban on minimum RPM. Nonetheless, various scholars, po-
litical actors, and enforcement officials have rejected Leegin, taking 
various steps to resist it. For instance, some members of Congress in-
troduced legislation to reverse Leegin, thereby codifying Dr. Miles by 
statute, a result endorsed by more than forty state attorneys general. 
At least one state has passed post-Leegin legislation banning mini-
mum RPM within its borders, and attorneys general and private 
plaintiffs in several states have attacked minimum RPM under state 
antitrust laws, often with success. Finally, some scholars have ar-
gued that lower courts applying Leegin should subject minimum 
RPM to a “quick look” rule of reason, presuming all such restraints 
unlawful unless the defendant meets a heavy burden of establishing 
that the restraint produces significant benefits. 
 Of course, Congress and the states are perfectly free to ignore eco-
nomic theory and ban conduct that is “reasonable” within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act. Thus, Congress has often overridden 
straightforward applications of the Sherman Act, either to exempt 
otherwise lawful conduct or to ban reasonable, wealth-creating con-
duct, sometimes at the behest of special interest groups that have 
lobbied for such exceptions. However, opponents of Leegin purport to 
embrace decisions such as Sylvania and disclaim reliance on any 
power to pass wealth-destroying legislation. Instead, these advocates 
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uniformly assert that minimum RPM almost always reduces welfare, 
thus purporting to rebut the Williamsonian presumption described 
above. Indeed, following the lead of these advocates, proposed federal 
legislation was premised upon findings that Leegin was an incorrect 
exposition of the Sherman Act. In so doing, these scholars and public 
officials reject the work of leading practitioners of TCE, including 
those who first offered transaction cost rationales for non-standard 
agreements, particularly minimum RPM, during the 1960s. In other 
words, these opponents of Leegin, while purporting to embrace TCE’s 
conclusions in other contexts, attack one of TCE’s foundational ex-
emplars by claiming that minimum RPM rarely, if ever, overcomes a 
failure in the distribution market. 
 This Article defends Leegin against its various detractors. In par-
ticular, the Article identifies and debunks several arguments that 
those who resist the decision have deployed in favor of reinstating 
Dr. Miles, whether by federal statute, state legislation, or judicial in-
terpretation of state antitrust law. As Leegin explained, there is a 
strong presumption in favor of full-blown rule of reason analysis of 
restraints challenged under Section 1; any departure from this 
standard must rest upon a concrete demonstration that a particular 
category of restraint is “always or almost always” unreasonable. TCE 
undermined Dr. Miles’s purely theoretical assumption that minimum 
RPM is the economic equivalent of a naked cartel between dealers, 
thereby casting upon modern proponents of per se condemnation a 
burden of providing and supporting a substitute rationale for such 
automatic illegality. None of these arguments, it is shown, comes 
close to carrying this burden or otherwise justifies a reversal of Lee-
gin, legislative or otherwise. Ironically, Dr. Miles itself has deprived 
its supporters of a factual record that might bolster their case, by 
preventing the sort of full-blown rule of reason analysis that could 
help shed light on the actual economic effects of the practice. Nor 
have Leegin’s detractors established the ordinary prerequisites for 
application of the “quick look” rule of reason to minimum RPM. 
 Indeed, the various objections to Leegin are objections to TCE, 
fundamental principles of antitrust jurisprudence, or both. Put an-
other way, arguments for displacing Leegin would, if taken to their 
logical conclusion, require courts also to overrule numerous other de-
cisions that reflect the economic learning of the TCE revolution. The 
result would be a body of antitrust law divorced from the very eco-
nomic theory that Congress expected courts to apply when fashioning 
antitrust doctrine. Far from correcting any purported error, reversal 
of Leegin by statute or otherwise would create another exemption 
from the Sherman Act under the guise of enhancing competition, a 
result analogous to the anti-competitive Robinson-Patman Act. At 
the same time, it seems unlikely that reimposition of a per se ban on 
2013] ASSORTED ANTI-LEEGIN CANARDS 913
minimum RPM would induce the Supreme Court to abandon deci-
sions such as Sylvania and its progeny. The result would therefore be 
an arbitrary distinction between price and non-price restraints, 
thereby causing parties to elect non-price restraints for reasons unre-
lated to wealth creation. It thus seems likely that federal courts and 
the federal enforcement agencies, who read exemptions from the an-
titrust laws narrowly, will adopt various strategies that minimize the 
impact of any legislative response to Leegin. Thus, resistance to Lee-
gin is not merely misguided as a matter of antitrust principle but is 
likely futile, as well. 
 Part II of this Article describes the normative, jurisprudential, 
and economic foundations of Section 1’s rule of reason. Part III re-
counts Dr. Miles’s per se ban on minimum RPM, which the Court 
equated with a horizontal dealer cartel. Part IV details the Court’s 
own effort to narrow Dr. Miles, as well as Congressional authoriza-
tion of so-called “fair trade” legislation, pursuant to which most 
states authorized minimum RPM for nearly four decades. Part V de-
scribes how neoclassical price theory gave rise to antitrust’s inhospi-
tality tradition, which manifested itself in judicial hostility to mini-
mum RPM and other non-standard agreements, including non-price 
vertical restraints. Part VI recounts the transaction cost revolution, 
which offered beneficial explanations for non-standard agreements, 
including minimum RPM. Part VII details the Supreme Court’s em-
brace of TCE, first in Sylvania and its progeny and then in Leegin.
Part VIII describes the resistance to Leegin and resulting proposals 
to reverse and/or undermine the decision. Part IX recounts and re-
futes various arguments made by Leegin’s detractors, showing that 
such arguments reject TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both. Part 
X offers some concluding observations, including various strategies 
that courts and the enforcement agencies might employ to minimize 
the anti-reason impact of legislation reimposing the per se rule.  
II. SECTION 1’S RULE OF REASON: APPLYING “ACCURATE       
ECONOMIC CONCEPTIONS”
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids “contract[s], combination[s, 
and] . . . conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade.”4 Taken literally, howev-
er, a ban on all agreements that “restrain trade” would grind the 
economy to a halt.5 In the beginning, then, the Supreme Court tem-
pered the Sherman Act’s “plain language” to avoid these wealth-
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
5. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[R]ead 
literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private contract law. Yet it is that body of law 
that establishes the enforceability of commercial agreements and enables competitive mar-
kets—indeed, a competitive economy—to function effectively.”). 
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destroying effects, holding that only direct restraints violate the Act.6
Such restraints, the Court held, included horizontal agreements be-
tween firms that had received special benefits from the State7 and 
purely private cartels that produced prices above the competitive lev-
el.8 By contrast, “indirect” restraints included contracts that were in-
cidental to some main, lawful purpose, such as covenants ancillary to 
the formation of a partnership or ancillary to the sale of a business.9
Congress, the Court said, did not mean to ban such minor restraints, 
even if they had a remote effect on price.10 Circuit Judge (and future 
Chief Justice) William Howard Taft, in his influential Addyston Pipe
decision, sketched a similar distinction between “ancillary” re-
straints, which were lawful absent some showing of harm, and “na-
ked” restraints, which were automatically unlawful.11
 In the landmark Standard Oil decision, the Supreme Court con-
firmed what had been implicit in prior decisions, namely, that Sec-
tion 1 only bans “unreasonable” restraints.12 In so doing, the Court 
emphasized the common law origins of the term “restraint of trade” 
and that a broader construction of the Act would interfere with 
wealth-creating commerce, not to mention liberty of contract.13 Not 
all agreements reducing competition were unreasonable, the Court 
said. Instead, an agreement was unreasonable if it restrained compe-
tition “unduly,” by producing monopoly or its consequences—higher 
6. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898) (Sherman Act 
bans only direct restraints of interstate commerce, leaving “indirect” restraints, including 
“ordinary contracts and combinations” unscathed); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 
591-92 (1898) (same). 
7. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 568-73 (holding that horizontal price fixing by inter-
state railroads was a “direct restraint” contrary to Section 1 because railroads had received 
special benefits from the state). 
8. See generally Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) 
(condemning private cartel agreement that produces unreasonably high prices as a direct 
restraint). 
9. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 567-70 (elaborating on the distinction between “di-
rect” and “indirect” restraints); Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 591-92 (same); United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-84 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211 
(1899). 
10. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 567-68; Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 591-92. 
11. See 85 F. 271. See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTIRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT 
WAR WITH ITSELF 26 (1993) (calling Taft’s Addyston Pipe opinion “one of the greatest”).  
12. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also United States v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (approving Standard Oil and extending the rule of 
reason to Section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
13. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63 (stating that a literal application of the Act 
“would be destructive of all right to contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever 
as to subjects embraced in interstate trade or commerce”); American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 
179-80 (Standard Oil held that the term “restraint of trade should be given a meaning 
which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult if not impossi-
ble any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce—the free movement of 
which it was the purpose of the statute to protect.”). See also Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil
as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 784 (2012). 
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prices, reduced output, and/or deteriorating quality—and thus had 
the same impact as a “direct” restraint.14 Moreover, the Court sug-
gested that some contracts were unreasonable on their face, because 
of their “nature or character,” and could thus be condemned without 
examination of their actual consequences.15 The Court also endorsed 
a flexible approach to the meaning of “restraint of trade,” discussing 
with approval common law decisions that had refashioned doctrine in 
light of “more accurate economic conceptions.”16 In the end, the Court 
said, the rule of reason required judges to employ “the light of rea-
son” to determine whether a challenged agreement offended “the 
public policy embodied in the statute,” a process that, while applying 
a fixed normative standard, could produce different doctrinal results 
as economic conceptions evolved over time.17 It is thus no surprise 
that antitrust doctrine has always reflected the influence of prevail-
ing economic theory.18
III.   DR. MILES BANS MINIMUM RPM:                                              
CONGRESS AND THE STATES RESIST
 Just six weeks before Standard Oil, the Court applied the di-
rect/indirect test to vertical restraints for the first time, in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.19 There, Dr. Miles sought to 
control resale prices by dealers distributing its products in two differ-
ent ways. First, the firm entered into consignment agreements with 
wholesalers. These agreements provided that consignees could only 
sell to firms designated by Dr. Miles and set a floor on such prices.20
Second, Dr. Miles appointed several thousand retailers authorized to 
purchase and thus take title to Dr. Miles’s product from consignees or 
other retailers.21 These contracts bound retailers not to sell below a 
14. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61-62. See also id. at 57, 61 (explaining that prohibition 
on restraints of trade was aimed at conduct “producing or tending to produce the conse-
quences of monopoly”); id. at 52 (listing “evils” of monopoly as: 1) the power to fix prices; 2) 
the power to limit output; and 3) the danger of deteriorating quality of the monopolized 
product); id. at 66 (stating that the rule of reason and the direct/indirect test articulated in 
Joint Traffic ban the same conduct and thus “come to one and the same thing”). 
15. Id. at 58. 
16. Id. at 55. See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW 
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 69 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that pre-Sherman Act 
common law reflected “rules of classical political economy concerning the nature of compe-
tition and the efficiency consequences of various anticompetitive practices”). 
17. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63-64. 
18. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 69 (“One of the great myths about American 
antitrust policy is that courts first began to adopt an ‘economic approach’ to antitrust prob-
lems in the relatively recent past. . . . [However,] [a]ntitrust has always been closely tied to 
prevailing economic doctrine.”). 
 19. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
20. Id. at 375-79 (reproducing consignment agreements). 
21. Id. at 379-81 (reproducing the contract between Dr. Miles and approved retailers).  
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particular price.22 In this way, Dr. Miles sought to limit intrabrand
competition, that is, competition between various dealers selling its 
own products, thereby leaving competition with other products—
interbrand competition—unscathed.23
 The case began as a tort action in federal court premised on diver-
sity of citizenship.24 Dr. Miles alleged that the defendant, an unap-
proved retailer, had induced approved retailers and consignees to sell 
it Dr. Miles’s product below contractually specified prices.25 Dr. Miles 
sought to enjoin the practice, claiming that the defendant had tor-
tiously interfered with the price-setting agreements by intentionally 
inducing breach.26 The defendant sought to avoid liability by claiming 
that the contract directly restrained interstate commerce contrary to 
Section 1.27
 The Court agreed with the defendant, holding that the agree-
ments between Dr. Miles and approved retailers “relate[d] directly to 
interstate as well as intrastate trade, and operate[d] to restrain trade 
or commerce among the several States” and had the “purpose” of re-
straining “the entire trade,” such that the restraint of trade was “ob-
vious.”28 The Court assumed that dealers, and not Dr. Miles, were the 
primary beneficiaries of higher retail prices.29 Even if Dr. Miles did 
derive some (unspecified) benefit, the Court said, its minimum RPM 
would fare no better than a “direct agreement” between dealers to fix 
prices.30 But such an agreement, the Court said, would contravene 
numerous Sherman Act and common law decisions banning naked 
horizontal price fixing.31 In short, the Court equated minimum RPM 
22. Id. at 380. 
23. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 490 (distinguishing intrabrand from inter-
brand competition). 
 24. Dr. Miles was an Indiana corporation and Park & Sons was a Kentucky corpora-
tion. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374, 381. 
25. Id. at 381-82. 
26. Id. at 382. 
27. Id. at 390-91. 
28. Id. at 400. 
29. Id. at 407 (“But the advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the 
dealers. The enlarged profits which would result from adherence to the established rates 
would go to them and not to the complainant. It is through the inability of the favored 
dealers to realize these profits, on account of the described competition, that the complain-
ant works out its alleged injury.”). 
30. Id. at 407-08 (“[T]he complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical con-
tracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to 
establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with 
each other. If the immediate advantage they would thus obtain would not be sufficient to 
sustain such a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit to the complainant cannot be 
regarded as sufficient to support its system.”). 
31. Id. at 408 (citing Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904); United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211 
(1899); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875); Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa 156 (1891); W.H. 
Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 127 N.W. 803 (Mich. 1910); People v. Milk Exchange, 145 
N.Y. 267 (1895); People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251 (1893); Judd v. Harrington, 139 N.Y. 105 
2013] ASSORTED ANTI-LEEGIN CANARDS 917
with a naked horizontal agreement between thousands of dealers and 
thus, not surprisingly, condemned it.32
IV.   THE COURT BACKTRACKS AND CONGRESS RESISTS
 Dr. Miles had a long and eventful life. Less than a decade after 
announcing the decision, the Court limited its reach, holding that 
manufacturers were free to announce a price and then terminate 
dealers who undercut it, absent an antecedent agreement between 
dealer and manufacturer fixing resale prices.33 Just seven years lat-
er, the Court, in an opinion by William Howard Taft, held that the 
automatic ban on minimum RPM did not apply when the manufac-
turer retained title to the product pursuant to a consignment agree-
ment appointing retailers as agents.34 By 1926, then, the Court had 
approved two different means of circumventing Dr. Miles.35
 The federal government itself imposed minimum RPM on some 
industries during the Great Depression. In 1933, Congress passed, 
and President Roosevelt signed, the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA).36 The Act authorized the President to impose “codes of fair 
competition” on an industry-by-industry basis. Within a year of pas-
sage, “approximately eighty [such] codes” mandated minimum 
RPM.37 Even before Congress had acted, some states, led by Califor-
nia, had immunized such agreements from attack under their own 
antitrust laws, so long as the agreements were truly vertical and took 
place in markets characterized by significant interbrand competition.38
 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the NIRA in A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, nullifying federally coerced 
(1893)). One of these decisions, it should be noted, involved minimum RPM. See W.H. Hill 
Co., 127 N.W. at 804. 
32. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 491 (Dr. Miles assumed “that RPM is really a 
manifestation of price fixing among the retailers, who have involved the manufacturer in 
the agreement so that it can help police the cartel.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 156 (1976) (“According to the Court in Dr. Miles, resale price 
maintenance benefits dealers (at least ‘primarily’) and is bad because it has the same effect 
as a dealers’ cartel.”). 
33. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
34. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 484 (1926). 
35. See Hon. William F. Baxter, Vertical Practices—Half Slave, Half Free, 52 
ANTITRUST L.J. 743, 744 (1983) (contending that, after Colgate and General Electric, “alt-
hough the Dr. Miles case was on the books, the industrial world was largely untroubled”). 
36. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195. 
37. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY 
IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 58-59 (1966). 
38. See 1931 Cal. Stat. 583 (authorizing minimum RPM whenever agreements were 
vertical and the products governed by such contracts faced “fair and open competition with 
commodities of the same general class produced by others”). See also Ewald T. Grether, 
Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L.
REV. 640, 640 & n.2 (1936) (reporting that, as of 1935, nine other states, in addition to Cali-
fornia, representing forty percent of the nation’s population, had adopted fair trade legisla-
tion). 
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minimum RPM.39 However, by 1937, forty-two states had authorized 
minimum RPM in intrastate commerce.40 That same year, Congress 
passed the Miller-Tydings Act, which gave these “fair trade” statutes 
interstate teeth.41 Passed at the behest of small, less efficient retail-
ers, Miller-Tydings immunized minimum RPM in interstate com-
merce whenever such agreements were truly vertical and the manu-
facturer’s product was subject to “full and free competition” from 
similar products.42 The 1952 McGuire Act strengthened Miller-
Tydings, allowing states to authorize the imposition of minimum 
RPM on so-called “non-signers,” that is, retailers who refused to en-
ter such agreements.43 At one time (before Alaska and Hawaii en-
tered the Union), forty-six of forty-eight states were so-called “fair 
trade” states, though the number fell to thirty-seven out of fifty       
by 1975.44
      V. DR. MILES REDUX: PRICE THEORY, THE INHOSPITALITY 
TRADITION, AND NON-PRICE RESTRAINTS
 Non-price vertical restraints received comparatively little atten-
tion until nearly four decades after Dr. Miles. In the late 1940s, the 
Department of Justice announced its view that vertically imposed ex-
clusive territories were unlawful per se and subsequently obtained 
numerous consent decrees banning the practice.45 The FTC attempt-
ed to follow suit in the 1960s but met resistance in the lower courts, 
which rejected the per se label and validated such restraints under a 
forgiving rule of reason.46 The Department of Justice met similar re-
sistance in the Supreme Court when it sought per se condemnation of 
39. See generally 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
40. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 398 (1951) (re-
porting that, by 1937, forty-two states had adopted fair trade laws). 
41. See Miller-Tydings Act, Pub. L. No. 75-314, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937). 
42. Id. See also LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
378 (1977) (reporting support for fair trade “by small retailers facing competition from 
more efficient chain[s]”); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist 
Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1011, 1064-67 (2005) (same). 
43. See McGuire Act, Pub. L. No. 82-542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952). 
44. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 9 (Harvey M. Ap-
plebaum et al. eds., 1975). Moreover, as of 1975, only sixteen states allowed manufacturers 
to enforce such agreements against non-signers. See id. See also Richard K. Bates, Consti-
tutionality of State Fair Trade Acts, 32 IND. L.J. 127, 134 (1957) (reporting that ten state 
supreme courts had found non-signer provisions unconstitutional). 
45. See Sigmund Timberg, Territorial Exclusives, 29 ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 243 (1965). 
46. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 849 (6th Cir. 1964) (rejecting ban on verti-
cally imposed exclusive territory); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 833 (7th Cir. 
1963) (same); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 
1962) (finding that exclusive territory imposed ancillary to a trademark license was rea-
sonable). See also Tri-Cont’l Fin. Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enters., 265 F.2d 619, 624-25 
(5th Cir. 1959) (sustaining as reasonable agreement preventing purchaser of a vessel from 
competing with the seller on certain routes for ten years). 
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agreements reserving certain customers to a manufacturer.47 As of 
1963, then, minimum RPM was unlawful per se (except in fair trade 
states), while vertical territorial restraints were judged under a 
friendly rule of reason. 
 The enforcement agencies’ attacks on non-price restraints followed 
naturally from the dominant economic paradigm of the time, neo-
classical price theory. Premised on the perfect competition model, 
price theory presumed that unconstrained atomistic markets func-
tioned effectively and that efficiencies were necessarily technological 
in nature and thus realized within firms.48 As a result, agreements 
that reached beyond the firm to constrain trading partners were nec-
essarily suspect, because they reduced rivalry without any possible 
benefits.49 Scholars operating within this tradition were suspicious of 
complete vertical integration and generally condemned partial con-
tractual integration such as tying agreements, exclusive dealing, 
RPM, or non-price vertical restraints.50
 Shortly after World War II, Courts began to embrace price theo-
ry’s account of non-standard agreements, producing the “inhospitali-
ty tradition” of antitrust law, a term coined by Donald Turner, the 
economist-lawyer who would head the antitrust division during the 
1960s.51 In particular, courts condemned numerous non-standard 
47. See generally White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
48. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 370-71 (1985) (explaining how price theory treated 
efficiencies as technological in nature and thus as arising “within” the firm). 
49. See id. at 366 (According to price theory, “efforts to reconfigure firm and market 
structures that violated those ‘natural’ boundaries were believed to have market power ori-
gins.”); id. at 371 (“[T]here is nothing to be gained [within price-theoretic paradigm] by in-
troducing nonstandard terms into market-mediated exchange . . . .”). 
50. See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 357-58 (1959) (contending that com-
plete vertical integration was generally motivated by a desire to acquire or protect market 
power); JOHN PERRY MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION: A STUDY IN CRITERIA FOR THE 
CONTROL OF TRADE PRACTICES 199-200 (1941) (contending that tying agreements were 
necessarily the result of monopoly power); Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the 
Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 307-08 
(arguing that exclusive dealing contracts serve no beneficial purpose); William S. Comanor,
Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1419, 1419 (1968) (contending that courts should condemn non-price vertical re-
straints as unlawful per se); Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: 
How the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
21, 44-45 (2005) (explaining how price theory’s hostility to non-standard contracts flowed 
from the inability to surmise a beneficial purpose of such limits on rivalry); George J. 
Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 8-13, 22 (1942) (conclud-
ing that such integration could produce technological efficiencies but usually injured com-
petition); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 699 (1962) [hereinafter 
Turner, Conscious Parallelism] (same); Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrange-
ments Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 73-74 (1958) [hereinafter Turner, 
Tying Arrangements] (arguing that courts should ban tying contracts). 
51. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 5 & 
n.8 (2005) (citing Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C.
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agreements as “unreasonable per se” or nearly so, because they: (1) 
always reduced rivalry between the parties to them and (2) always 
lacked redeeming virtues.52
 Four years after rejecting a per se ban for territorial restraints, 
the Supreme Court reversed course, at Turner’s behest, in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.53 Relying upon Dr. Miles and price-
theoretic logic, the Court condemned non-price vertical restraints, 
such as exclusive territories and customer allocations as unreasona-
ble per se, whenever title had passed from manufacturer to dealer.54
Like franchising itself, the Court said, such restraints were not a 
“usual” method of business, and they reduced competition without 
countervailing virtues.55 At the same time, the Court rejected the bid 
by the United States to go even further, that is, to apply the same per 
se ban to restraints the defendant had accomplished through con-
signment arrangements.56 According to the Court, intrabrand compe-
tition was not the only relevant consideration under the rule of rea-
son, and the restraints Schwinn had imposed on consignees did not 
restrain (interbrand) competition in the “product market as a 
whole.”57 As a result, the Court said, rule of reason treatment was 
appropriate, and there was no reason to disturb the district court’s 
finding that the intrabrand restraints contained in the defendant’s 
consignment arrangements furthered overall competition.58 Shortly 
thereafter the Court held that dealers who had entered minimum 
RPM and other non-standard contracts could nonetheless challenge 
such agreements, because manufacturers generally employed coer-
cive market power to impose them.59 The Court did not square this 
L. REV. 5, 47 (2004) [hereinafter Meese, Intrabrand Restraints]) (attributing this term to 
Turner). See also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 119-34 (2003) [hereinafter Meese, Rule of Reason] (describing inhospital-
ity tradition’s price-theoretic origins and resulting influence on antitrust doctrine). 
52. See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 124-34 (detailing these judicial de-
velopments). See also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (articulating 
this two-part per se rule). 
 53. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Antitrust En-
forcement: Transition Years, 17 ANTITRUST 61, 64 (2003) (describing Turner’s role in gov-
ernment’s Schwinn brief).  
54. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379 (citing Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 
220 U.S. 373 (1911)) (“Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable, without more for a 
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be 
traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.”). 
55. Id. (“To permit [post-sale restraints] would sanction franchising and confinement 
of distribution as the ordinary instead of the unusual method which may be permissible in 
an appropriate and impelling competitive setting, since most merchandise is distributed by 
means of purchase and sale.”). 
56. Id. at 379-80 (describing the government’s argument). 
57. Id. at 381-82. 
58. Id. at 380-81 (invoking the trial court’s findings that restraints contained in con-
signment agreements helped Schwinn compete against mass merchandisers). 
59. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
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claim with Dr. Miles’s equation of minimum RPM with a dealer car-
tel.60 The Court also banned maximum RPM, which assured consum-
ers lower prices than dealers might charge.61
 Following the same dictates of price theory, Congress repealed fair 
trade legislation in 1975, thereby restoring Dr. Miles by default.62
Thus, for the first time in 85 years, both price and non-price agree-
ments were unlawful per se throughout the land, so long as title had 
passed to the dealer.63 At the same time, identical agreements im-
posed via consignment arrangements were analyzed under a forgiv-
ing rule of reason.64
VI.   THE REVOLUTION COMETH: TCE DISPLACES PRICE THEORY
 Even during the inhospitality era, dissenting scholars rejected 
price theory’s focus on technological efficiencies and the resulting 
condemnation of vertical restraints. For instance, three decades be-
fore Schwinn, Ronald Coase offered a non-technological explanation 
for the existence of firms and thus vertical integration.65 According to 
Coase, the firm was a particular type of contract, whereby employees 
agreed to follow the directives of employers within a broad range.66
Moreover, Coase argued that economic actors rely upon firms to con-
duct economic activity when the alternative—reliance upon atomistic 
markets—results in prohibitive costs, what economists would later 
call transaction costs.67 Thus, Coase implied that technological con-
siderations were beside the point because, absent transaction costs, 
independent economic actors who owned each distinct phase of the 
production process could bargain to employ the most efficient pro-
cess.68 Moreover, while Coase did not explicitly say so, his insight al-
60. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968). 
62. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. See also 
SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 378-79 (discussing repeal of fair trade laws with approval); id.
at 14-17 (discussing various price-theoretic texts as sources of economic learning relevant 
to antitrust); id. at 379-87 (articulating classic price-theoretic objections to minimum 
RPM). 
63. See supra notes 35, 54-58 and accompanying text (explaining how Colgate, Gen-
eral Electric, and Schwinn limited the per se rule to instances of actual agreement between 
manufacturer and dealer regarding product whose title had passed). 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-82 (1967) (an-
alyzing territorial restraints imposed via consignment agreements under a forgiving rule of 
reason). 
65. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
66. Id. at 390-91. 
67. See id. at 391-92; see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967) (employing the term “transaction costs”). 
68. See Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transaction Costs and the New In-
stitutionalism, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS AND WELFARE 395, 397-98 
(George R. Feiwel ed., 1985) (explaining that technical economies cannot explain firm 
boundaries because, absent transaction costs, such economies can “be achieved equally well 
if the factors of production are owned by independent individuals”). 
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so suggested a non-technological explanation for partial integration, 
that is, contractual integration that stood somewhere between “firm” 
and “market.”69
 However, as Coase himself has admitted, his work was “much cit-
ed and little used.”70 Certainly Coase’s lessons were lost on the price 
theorists who ritually condemned partial contractual integration. 
These scholars simply could not explain such agreements absent a 
hypothesis of monopoly power.71 It was not until 1960 that scholars 
offered beneficial accounts of non-standard agreements, accounts 
that resonated with Coase’s transaction cost insight. Most famously, 
Lester Telser contended that manufacturers who rely upon market 
transactions—sales to independent dealers—to distribute their prod-
ucts might adopt minimum RPM for reasons contrary to the interests 
of those dealers.72 In particular, Telser contended that, left to their 
own devices, dealers might “free ride” on efforts by other dealers to 
promote the manufacturer’s product, efforts that required invest-
ments that dealers could not recover once made.73 The prospect of 
such free riding, he said, might deter dealers from making such in-
vestments.74 By imposing minimum RPM, Telser said, manufacturers 
could prevent low service dealers from luring away customers with 
price cuts, thereby ensuring that dealers who did make such invest-
ments would recoup them.75 While Telser did not mention Coase or 
“transaction costs,” his insight identified costs of market transact-
ing—free riding, market failure, and suboptimal promotion—that man-
ufacturers could avoid by means of partial contractual integration.76
 While the Supreme Court and the enforcement agencies ignored 
Telser’s work, others did not. Most notably, Robert Bork embraced 
and expanded Telser’s argument, arguing that non-price vertical re-
straints, such as exclusive territories, could also prevent free riding.77
69. See R.H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 29-30 
(1988) (discussing unpublished notes from the 1930s assessing transaction cost rationales 
for partial integration). 
70. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY
ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 62-63 (Victor R. 
Fuchs ed., 1972). 
71. See Meese, supra note 50, at 44-45 (explaining how price theory’s hostility to non-
standard contracts flowed from the inability to surmise any beneficial purpose of such lim-
its on rivalry).  
72. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 86, 86-87 (1960). 
73. Id. at 91-92. 
 74. Id.
 75. Id.
76. See Meese, supra note 50, at 52-53 (contending that Telser’s insight was an early 
application of TCE). 
 77. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Price Fixing]. See also Robert 
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Moreover, Bork expressly embraced Coase’s assertion that “the firm” 
was simply one form of contractual integration and argued that par-
tial contractual integration, including minimum RPM and exclusive 
territories, could also produce efficiencies.78 As a result, Bork said, 
courts should treat partial integration the same way as, say, com-
plete integration by merger, validating both absent an affirmative 
showing of anticompetitive harm.79 Moreover, Bork did not limit his 
analysis to vertical restraints, but applied the same reasoning to 
some horizontal restraints.80 Such an approach, he said, would simp-
ly replicate the approach taken with respect to other ancillary re-
straints, such as covenants ancillary to the formation of a partner-
ship, which Bork treated as a paradigmatic case in which non-
standard contracts could overcome market failure.81
 Other scholars soon embraced and elaborated upon the Telser-
Bork line of argument.82 Among these scholars was Oliver William-
son, who, like Coase, would later win the Nobel Prize for his work ar-
ticulating the transaction cost paradigm.83 While a special employee 
at the Department of Justice, Williamson had objected to the gov-
ernment’s brief in Schwinn.84 Eight years later, Williamson suggest-
ed that vertical integration was presumptively an effort to minimize 
transaction costs.85 Four years after that he suggested that market 
restrictions like those condemned in Schwinn were presumptively 
methods of economizing on transaction costs, including the harm 
H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950 (1968) [here-
inafter Bork, Resale Price Maintenance]. 
78. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 384 n.29; id. at 474; Meese, supra note 
50, at 53-54 (describing Bork’s reliance on Coase’s transaction cost reasoning). 
79. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 472 (footnote omitted) (citing Coase, su-
pra note 65) (“In economic analysis, a contract integration is as much a firm as an owner-
ship integration. The nature of the standards applied to them through the Sherman Act 
should be the same.”). Ironically, Coase was unaware of Bork’s work when he claimed that 
his article, while cited during the 1960s, had no “noticeable effect on what was written in 
the text.” See Coase, supra note 69, at 23. 
80. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 429-38 (discussing the benefits of hori-
zontal and vertical intrabrand restraints interchangeably in support of rule of reason 
treatment for both). 
81. Id. at 380-82. 
 82. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 
ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Re-
strictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust 
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Mer-
ger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975). 
 83. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Prize in Econom-
ic Sciences 2009 (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/         
laureates/2009/press.pdf. 
84. See Williamson, supra note 53, at 64 (recounting this objection). 
85. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 20 (1975) (footnote omitted) (stating that “a presumption of mar-
ket failure is warranted where it is observed that transactions are shifted out of a market 
and into a firm”). 
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caused by opportunistic free riding by dealers.86 As Bork had done 
over a decade earlier, Williamson analogized the (beneficial) impact 
of such non-price vertical restraints to the impact of minimum 
RPM.87 Moreover, Williamson would subsequently reiterate that TCE 
dictates a “rebuttable presumption” that complete integration or par-
tial integration via non-standard contract reflects voluntary coopera-
tion between economic actors that reduces the cost of transacting and 
thus increases economic welfare.88
 As Williamson would later explain, these developments reflected a 
genuine scientific revolution in industrial organization theory.89
Moreover, this revolution had implications far beyond the law of ver-
tical restraints or, for that matter, antitrust.90 Indeed, scholars have 
employed transaction cost reasoning to problems as varied as inter-
national security arrangements,91 company towns,92 sharecropping,93
and marriage.94 In short, the economics profession has embraced TCE 
as a theoretical apparatus that can inform research agendas in a va-
 86. See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Rami-
fications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 955 (1979) [hereinafter 
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions] (explaining that “free rid[ing]” was an 
example of “subgoal pursuit” by franchisees that could undermine the franchise system). 
See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considera-
tions, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1440 n.3 (1974) [hereinafter Williamson, The Economics of 
Antitrust] (stating, without additional explanation, that “the [restraints challenged in 
Schwinn] can usefully be examined in transaction cost terms”). 
87. See Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 86, at 958 n.26 
(explaining that both minimum RPM and exclusive territories can combat such free riding) 
(citing POSNER, supra note 32, at 149-50, 160, 185; Telser, supra note 72, at 86). 
88. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 28 (contending that there is “a rebuttable pre-
sumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes”); Williamson, 
Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 86, at 958 (“The basic presumption of 
the transaction cost approach is that successive interfaces are organized in a manner that 
economizes on transaction costs.”). See also Alan J. Meese, Market Power and Contract 
Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1291 (2013) (explaining how TCE implies that parties enter efficient non-
standard contacts voluntarily). 
89. See Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution: Account-
ing for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457 (2010). See also 
Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 274 (1987) (concluding that 
TCE and the resulting reinterpretation of vertical integration was a manifestation of a 
“genuine scientific revolution”). 
 90. For a summary of the influence of transaction cost reasoning in antitrust, see Paul 
L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 95 (2002). 
 91. See Katja Weber, Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach to 
International Security Cooperation, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 321 (1997). 
 92. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 35-38. 
 93. See Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, Transaction Costs and the Design of 
Cropshare Contracts, 24 RAND J. ECON. 78 (1993). 
 94. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents: Or, “I Gave Him the Best 
Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987). 
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riety of fields.95 This ability to inspire and inform disparate re-
search agendas or “normal science” is the hallmark of a successful 
scientific paradigm.96
VII. THE SUPREME COURT JOINS THE REVOLUTION:                           
FROM SYLVANIA TO LEEGIN
 Just two years after Congress repudiated “fair trade,” the Su-
preme Court abandoned the consistent treatment of price and non-
price vertical restraints, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc.97 There, the Court reconsidered Schwinn. The Court rejected 
Schwinn’s dispositive focus on the passage of title, holding that no 
meaningful economic distinction justified disparate treatment of sale 
and non-sale transactions.98 Moreover, the Court announced that 
courts should examine both types of restraints under the rule of rea-
son, thus overruling Schwinn’s recent and novel per se ban on some 
non-price restraints.99
 The Court conceded that non-price restraints necessarily reduced 
intrabrand competition, that is, competition between dealers.100 How-
ever, the mere fact that a restraint always reduced such competition 
did not thereby render it unlawful per se under prevailing doctrine, 
the Court said.101 Instead, such restraints also had to lack redeeming 
virtues to merit such outright condemnation.102 Relying upon recent 
advances in economic theory, more precisely TCE, the Court conclud-
ed that such restraints could produce redeeming virtues in some cas-
es, thereby undermining the case for per se condemnation.103 Most 
famously, the Court asserted that such agreements could encourage 
95. See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction 
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 336-38 (1995) (re-
counting various other applications of TCE). 
96. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962). 
 97. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
98. Id. at 47-57. 
99. Id. at 57-59. 
100. Id. at 54 (“Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the 
number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given group of 
buyers.”). 
101. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (describing the two-part per se rule 
applied during the inhospitality era). 
102. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 
5 (1958)). See also supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
103. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-58 (noting that such restraints might produce “re-
deeming virtue[s],” thereby obviating per se condemnation, and explaining that restraints 
can aid in maintaining interbrand competition (citing Posner, supra note 82, at 283, 285, 
287-88; Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 403)). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Sympo-
sium on Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918, 920 (1979) (explaining that 
Sylvania assumed that “the transaction-cost approach provide[s] a sounder basis for anti-
trust enforcement in this area”). 
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dealers to promote the manufacturer’s product by ensuring that a 
dealer could capture the benefits of promotional investments.104
 Absent such restrictions, the Court said, dealers could locate any-
where they wished, and dealers who declined to engage in promotion 
could free ride on those who did.105 The prospect of such free riding 
could deter all dealers from engaging in promotion, thereby hamper-
ing interbrand competition, which the Court characterized as “the 
primary concern of antitrust law.”106 Because such restraints could 
produce such redeeming virtues, the Court said, courts should not 
condemn them unless fact-intensive rule of reason scrutiny estab-
lished that they produced harm.107 However, the Court empha-   
sized that it had no intent to disturb Dr. Miles’s per se ban on             
minimum RPM.108
 The Court’s simultaneous (re)embrace of Dr. Miles and invocation 
of the free riding rationale to justify overruling Schwinn was ironic. 
After all, scholars had first articulated the free riding rationale in the 
context of minimum RPM.109 Others, including Robert Bork and Oli-
ver Williamson, later extended this rationale to non-price restraints 
as part of the larger transaction cost revolution.110 Thus, invocation of 
this rationale to justify rule of reason treatment for non-price re-
straints seemed to undermine Dr. Miles. Indeed, concurring in Syl-
vania, Justice White resisted the free rider rationale because it 
would also call Dr. Miles into question.111 As he put it, “[t]he effect, if 
not the intention, of the Court’s opinion is necessarily to call into 
question the firmly established per se rule against price restraints.”112
Scholars agreed that the rationale of Sylvania, if applied consistent-
ly, would ultimately require the Court to repudiate Dr. Miles.113
 Sylvania was not a “one off” or a sport, but instead became a driv-
ing force behind widespread reformulation of antitrust doctrine over 
the next three decades, reformulation that paralleled scientific ad-
vances brought about by the TCE revolution.114 In NCAA v. Board of 
 104. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-56. 
105. Id. at 55. 
106. Id. at 52 n.19. 
107. Id. at 57-59. 
108. Id. at 51 n.18 (“The per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firm-
ly for many years and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy.”). 
109. See Telser, supra note 72, at 91-92.  
110. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (collecting authorities). 
111. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he economic arguments in 
favor of allowing vertical nonprice restraints generally apply to vertical price restraints as 
well.”). 
112. Id. at 70. 
 113. See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV.
171; Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
114. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 46-56 (describing numerous applications of 
TCE in the antitrust context). See also Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 134-44 (de-
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Regents of the University of Oklahoma, for instance, the Court in-
voked Sylvania for the proposition that horizontal restraints on com-
petition “in a limited aspect of a market may actually enhance mar-
ketwide competition,” thereby preventing per se condemnation of the 
restraints before the Court.115 Shortly thereafter, in Business Elec-
tronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., the Court cited Sylvania for 
the proposition “that there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-
reason standard” and “that interbrand competition is the primary 
concern of the antitrust laws.”116 The Court also invoked Sylvania for 
the proposition that “[t]he Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint 
of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law 
itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had as-
signed to the term in 1890.”117 As a result, the Court said, changed 
economic understandings of the impact of trade restraints could justi-
fy reversal of a decision that depended upon a different understand-
ing.118 The Court also relied upon Sylvania for the proposition that an 
agreement between a dealer and a manufacturer to terminate anoth-
er, price-cutting dealer could reflect a procompetitive effort to combat 
free riding by the latter.119
 The Court again invoked Sylvania a decade later, when reconsid-
ering and reversing the per se ban on maximum RPM.120 The Court 
unanimously reiterated Sylvania’s conclusion “that the primary pur-
pose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition.”121 The 
Court also reiterated that Congress expected the courts to draw upon 
dynamic common law tradition when implementing the Sherman Act 
and that it was appropriate to “reconsider[] its decisions construing 
the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those deci-
sions are called into serious question.”122
scribing the evolution of TCE and its influence on the scope of per se rules during this peri-
od); Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 11-23 (2003) (describing the relevance of TCE for various antitrust prob-
lems). 
 115. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984). See also Meese, 
supra note 50, at 28-29 (describing this aspect of NCAA).
116. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).  
117. Id. at 732 (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21). 
118. See id. at 731 (“The term ‘restraint of trade’ in the statute, like the term at com-
mon law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a particular economic conse-
quence, which may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in varying times and 
circumstances. The changing content of the term ‘restraint of trade’ was well recognized at 
the time the Sherman Act was enacted.”). 
119. See id. (invoking Sylvania for the proposition that “manufacturers are often moti-
vated by a legitimate desire to have dealers provide services, combined with the reality 
that price cutting is frequently made possible by ‘free riding’ on the services provided by 
other dealers”). 
120. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 121. Id. at 15 (citing Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 726). 
122. Id. at 21. 
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 The Supreme Court finally accepted what Justice White had char-
acterized as Sylvania’s invitation to overrule Dr. Miles in Leegin Cre-
ative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.123 There, the plaintiff, a re-
tailer, challenged the defendant’s nationwide imposition of minimum 
RPM.124 In the lower court, the defendant offered to prove, via expert 
testimony, that the restraint was necessary to reduce the cost of 
transacting—relying upon the market to distribute its goods—by 
overcoming a market failure and encouraging approved retailers to 
promote the defendant’s products.125 Relying on Dr. Miles, both the 
trial court and the Fifth Circuit rejected this offer to prove that a per 
se unlawful practice produced benefits.126
 The Court began its analysis by adopting the same standard for 
per se liability as Sylvania or, for that matter, numerous cases from 
the inhospitality era. That is, to merit per se condemnation, a re-
straint must have “ ‘manifestly anticompetitive’ effects” and, in addi-
tion, “lack . . . any redeeming virtue.”127 The Court acknowledged that 
minimum RPM could, under some conditions, pose anticompetitive 
risks.128 For instance, industry-wide minimum RPM could facilitate a 
manufacturer cartel by discouraging a manufacturer from cutting 
prices, because dealers could not pass those discounts on to consum-
ers.129 However, relying upon the sort of transaction cost reasoning 
employed in Sylvania and subsequent decisions, the Court explained 
that economists had identified numerous “procompetitive effects” as-
sociated with minimum RPM, benefits that had not been apparent to 
the Dr. Miles Court.130 These benefits, the Court said, were similar to 
benefits produced by non-price vertical restraints, benefits the Court 
had recognized as “redeeming virtues” in Sylvania and subsequent 
decisions.131 For instance, the Court said, minimum RPM could pre-
vent dealers from free riding on each other’s promotional services, 
encouraging dealers to make promotional investments.132 Moreover, 
minimum RPM could facilitate a manufacturer’s reliance upon deal-
ers who have cultivated a reputation for selling high quality mer-
chandise, thereby allowing consumers to rely upon such retailers’ 
 123. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
124. Id. at 882-84 (detailing the history and content of the restraint). 
125. Id. at 884-85 (detailing lower court proceedings). 
 126. Id.
127. Id. at 886 (quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977); 
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985)). 
128. See id. at 892-94. 
129. Id. at 892. 
130. Id. at 889 (“[E]conomics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for 
a manufacturer’s use of [minimum] resale price maintenance.”). 
131. Id. at 890 (“The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for 
other vertical restraints.” (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57)). 
132. See id. at 890-91 (citing POSNER, supra note 32, at 172-73). 
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certification of the quality of the products in question.133 By prevent-
ing discounting, the Court said, minimum RPM can protect the eco-
nomic viability of firms that make the investments necessary to 
maintain a high quality operation.134 As a result, the Court said, min-
imum RPM could facilitate interbrand competition, including new 
entry by upstart manufacturers who could assure themselves of pro-
motion and/or quality certification adequate to wrest consumers 
away from established brands.135
 The Court also invoked literature contending that minimum RPM 
can produce benefits in retail markets not susceptible to free riding. 
By granting dealers a guaranteed margin, minimum RPM can ensure 
that dealers expect to receive a stream of earnings greater than they 
would receive in a perfectly competitive market.136 Dealers will forfeit 
these earnings (what economists call a “performance bond”) if termi-
nated, giving the manufacturer a powerful tool for ensuring dealers’ 
compliance with the manufacturer’s expectations for dealer perfor-
mance.137 Each of these explanations was an application of TCE, 
which predicts that unconstrained dealers may behave opportunisti-
cally, imposing costs on manufacturers and consumers.138 Each also 
depended upon the assumption, articulated in Sylvania and subse-
133. See id. at 891 (citing Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price 
Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 347-49 (1984)). 
134. See id.
135. Id. at 890-91 (Minimum RPM “can increase interbrand competition by facilitating 
market entry for new firms and brands.”). 
136. Id. at 892 (“Offering the retailer a guaranteed margin and threatening termina-
tion if it does not live up to expectations may be the most efficient way to expand the man-
ufacturer’s market share by inducing the retailer’s performance and allowing it to use its 
own initiative and experience in providing valuable services.”). 
137. See id. The Court also opined that this strategy would allow manufacturers to rely 
upon dealer “initiative and experience in providing valuable services.” Id. However, the 
Court did not explain how a manufacturer could pursue a strategy of relying upon dealers’ 
individual judgments about appropriate promotional strategies while at the same time 
possessing concrete, enforceable expectations about what strategies dealers should pursue, 
expectations that could form the basis for a decision to terminate a dealer. See Alan J. 
Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 615-16 (2004) 
(questioning the claim that manufacturers employ performance bonds to enforce particular 
promotional expectations). Nonetheless, this shortcoming does not itself undermine this 
“performance bond” theory of minimum RPM. That is, a manufacturer may wish to de-
mand a performance bond from its dealers even if it does not mean to rely upon their ex-
pertise in choosing promotional strategies. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, 
Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266-67 
(1988) (explaining reasons that may induce manufacturers to demand performance bonds 
to assure dealer performance of obligations unrelated to promotional free riding). Moreo-
ver, where manufacturers do wish to decentralize promotional decisionmaking, minimum 
RPM and non-price vertical restraints can serve as contractual property rights, ensuring 
that dealers who make promotional investments internalize the benefits of doing so. See 
Bork, supra note 77, at 956; Meese, supra, at 595-607; see also Howard P. Marvel, Exclu-
sive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1982). 
138. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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quently reaffirmed, that interbrand competition is the primary con-
cern of antitrust.139
 The Court did not assert that minimum RPM always or even usu-
ally produces one or more of the benefits just identified. Instead, the 
Court merely concluded that beneficial minimum RPM is neither in-
frequent nor hypothetical.140 As a result, the Court could not conclude 
that minimum RPM “always or almost always tend[s] to restrict 
competition and decrease output,” with the result that such con-
tracts should, like non-price restraints, receive fact-intensive rule of       
reason scrutiny.141
 Of course, Dr. Miles was a long-standing precedent.142 Nonethe-
less, invoking Sylvania and other decisions, the Court explained that 
the doctrine of stare decisis had less weight in the antitrust context, 
given the common law nature of the Sherman Act.143 The Court had 
relied upon similar TCE-based arguments when rejecting bans on 
non-price vertical restraints and maximum price fixing; there was no 
reason to ignore such new learning in the context of minimum 
RPM.144 This learning, of course, had undermined the central premise 
of Dr. Miles, namely, that minimum RPM is economically indistin-
guishable from naked horizontal price fixing between dealers.145 In-
deed, retaining Dr. Miles would call Sylvania and its progeny into 
question.146 Finally, the ban on minimum RPM could simply encour-
age manufacturers to respond by adopting non-price restraints that 
were less efficient, and sometimes more anticompetitive, sim-    
ply because such restrictions were treated less harshly than             
price restraints.147
139. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 (“[T]he primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to pro-
tect [interbrand] competition.” (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 15 (1997))). 
140. See id. at 894 (“[A]lthough empirical evidence on the topic is limited, it does not 
suggest efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical.”). 
 141. Id. at 894 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 
(1988)). 
142. See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1987) (finding that New 
York’s regulatory imposition of minimum resale liquor prices contravened Dr. Miles); Cont’l 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (reaffirming Dr. Miles in dicta).
143. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (“Stare decisis is not as significant in this case, howev-
er, because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act. . . . From the beginning the 
Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”).  
144. Id. at 900-02 (“[T]he Court, following a common-law approach, has continued to 
temper, limit, or overrule once strict prohibitions on vertical restraints.”). 
145. Id. at 888 (describing Dr. Miles’s unjustified equation of manufacturer-imposed 
minimum RPM with horizontal collusion between dealers). 
146. Id. at 902 (“If we were to decide the procompetitive effects of resale price mainte-
nance were insufficient to overrule Dr. Miles, then cases such as Colgate and GTE Sylvania
themselves would be called into question.”). 
147. Id. For instance, the Court noted that exclusive territories by their nature elimi-
nate all forms of competition between dealers, while minimum RPM merely limits price 
competition. Id. at 903-04. 
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VIII.   THE NEW RESISTANCE
 Many accepted Leegin as a straightforward application of TCE to 
minimum RPM, given the Court’s common law authority to adjust 
doctrine in light of new learning.148 However, some scholars, lawyers, 
and political actors have chosen to resist Leegin to the utmost. Such 
resistance has taken many forms. For instance, just as industry 
sought legislative relief from Dr. Miles, some current and former en-
forcement officials, including the attorneys general of forty-one 
states, have asked Congress for relief from Leegin.149 Some members 
of Congress introduced bills that would do just that, i.e., amend the 
Sherman Act to codify Dr. Miles.150 The Senate Judiciary Committee 
approved one such bill in November 2011, after receiving testimony 
from low-cost retailers critical of Leegin.151 Others have invoked “an-
titrust federalism” and advocated state legislation banning minimum 
RPM.152 Several state attorneys general have brought post-Leegin ac-
tions against minimum RPM, urging courts to ignore Leegin and con-
demn such restraints outright under existing state antitrust laws.153
 148. Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason 
for Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937, 1940-41 
(2009). 
149. See, e.g., Testimony before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy, H.R., 
Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, Fed-
eral Trade Commission) [hereinafter Harbour Testimony 2009], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Harbour090428.pdf; The Leegin Decision: The End 
of the Consumer Discounts or Good Antitrust Policy?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 6-8 (2007) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Sheehy Professor of Antitrust Law and 
Regulation, Georgetown University Law School) [hereinafter Leegin Senate Judiciary 
Hearing], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg41548/pdf/CHRG-
110shrg41548.pdf; Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., in 
Support for the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 3190) to Rep. John 
Conyers, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., U.S. House of Representatives and Rep. La-
mar Smith, Ranking Member, House Judiciary Comm., U.S. House of Representatives 
(Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from 41 State Attorneys General], available at
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/20091027.HR_3190.pdf.  
150. See, e.g., Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 75, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Discount Pricing and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. (2009). 
151. See Jeffrey May, Senate Bill Restoring Per Se Rule for Resale Price Maintenance 
Passes Senate Judiciary Committee, TRADE REG. TALK (Nov. 7, 2011, 1:36 PM), 
http://traderegulation.blogspot.com/2011/11/senate-bill-restoring-per-se-rule-for.html. See
also Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 8-10 (reproducing testimony of 
one such retailer). 
152. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-204(b) (West 2009); Joseph Pereira, State Law 
Targets ‘Minimum Pricing,’  WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB124087840110661643.html. See also Richard A. Duncan & Allison K. Guernsey, Waiting 
for the Other Shoe to Drop: Will State Courts Follow Leegin?, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 173, 174 
(2008) (identifying at least thirteen states where minimum RPM is likely unlawful per se
under current law). 
153. See New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-CV-02977, 2008-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 76,454 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 25, 2008) (stipulated final judgment and consent decree 
awarding damages and banning minimum RPM under state law); California v. Bioele-
ments, Inc., No. 10011659, 2011 WL 486328 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 11, 2011) (proposed 
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Private parties, too, have invoked state laws when attacking such re-
straints; just last year one state supreme court declared the restraint 
challenged in Leegin unlawful per se within its own borders.154 Final-
ly, some scholars and most states have embraced a temporary 
fallback position, contending that, so long as Leegin is good law, fed-
eral courts should subject minimum RPM to the “quick look” version 
of the rule of reason, under which the mere existence of a challenged 
restraint establishes a prima facie case, thereby casting upon         
the defendant a burden of adducing evidence that the restraint             
produces benefits.155
 There is, of course, no constitutional or other barrier preventing 
Congress or the states from reinstating Dr. Miles. There is a long his-
tory of Congress overriding straightforward applications of the 
Sherman Act, either to exempt otherwise unlawful conduct or to ban 
reasonable conduct that would otherwise create wealth, sometimes at 
the behest of special interest groups that stand to benefit from such 
exceptions.156 Fair trade legislation provides an example of the for-
mer, while the 1935 Robinson-Patman Act is a prime example of the 
latter.157 Like fair trade legislation, Robinson-Patman, which bans 
certain forms of price discrimination, was passed at the behest of 
small retailers, who feared that more efficient chains would obtain 
volume discounts from manufacturers and pass such discounts on    
to consumers.158
final judgment including permanent injunction detailing a consent decree banning mini-
mum RPM under state law); People v. Tempur-Pedic Intl., Inc., 944 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2012) (considering a state challenge to minimum RPM under New York law). See 
also Alan M. Barr, Antitrust Federalism in Action—State Challenges to Vertical Price Fix-
ing in the Post-Leegin World, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2009, at 1 (describing these and 
other post-Leegin challenges to minimum RPM). 
154. See O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 277 P.3d 1062, 1086-88 (Kan. 
2012) (declaring minimum RPM unlawful per se under Kansas antitrust law). But cf. Spahr 
v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 20, 2008) (applying the rule of reason under Tennessee law). 
155. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (elaborating on the “quick look” 
framework); John B. Kirkwood, Rethinking Antitrust Policy Toward RPM, 55 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 423 (2010); see also infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text (collecting authorities 
contending that courts should subject minimum RPM to a “quick look” analysis). 
156. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
APRIL 2007 Ch. IV.B (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report 
_recommendation/letter_to_president.pdf (detailing various exemptions from the antitrust 
laws); Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War 
with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216 (2012) (contending that the new federal consumer 
protection regime rejects consumer sovereignty and bans conduct that would be unobjec-
tionable under consumer-centered antitrust policy). 
 157. Robinson-Patman Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936)). 
158. See Schragger, supra note 42, at 1060-66 (describing the anti-efficiency impetus 
for the Robinson-Patman Act). See also Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Su-
preme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70, 70-71 (1967) (describing anti-consumer 
consequences of the Robinson-Patman Act). 
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 Indeed, as explained earlier, Congress has sometimes even im-
posed anticompetitive restraints against parties’ will.159 States too 
are free to coerce their citizens into conduct that would be felonious if 
adopted by private parties, even when such “regulation” destroys 
wealth and transfers income from out-of-state consumers to in-state 
producers or from one set of producers to the other.160 They may also 
ban conduct that would be wealth-creating and thus lawful under the 
Sherman Act.161
 However, Leegin’s detractors have not invoked the authority of 
states or the national government to ban otherwise reasonable re-
straints. Moreover, these advocates would reject any analogy to fair 
trade legislation or the Robinson-Patman Act. Instead they argue 
that Leegin “got it wrong” when applying basic antitrust principles 
animating the rule of reason. Moreover, legislation proposed in 2011 
that would have codified Dr. Miles was premised upon a finding that 
Leegin “incorrectly interpreted the Sherman Act.”162 For those who 
resist Leegin, then, a Congressional or state per se ban on minimum 
RPM or judicial adoption of a “quick look” approach would merely 
undo the Court’s purported mistake. 
 The remaining parts of this Article identify and refute numerous 
arguments that those resisting Leegin have made for restoring Dr.
Miles. Each argument, it is seen, rejects TCE, basic antitrust princi-
ples, or both. As a result, one cannot characterize restoration of Dr.
Miles as a bona fide application of Standard Oil’s rule of reason. In-
stead, reimposition of the ban on minimum RPM would constitute a 
rejection of the “more accurate economic conceptions”163 that should 
drive antitrust doctrine and thus be akin to a welfare-reducing spe-
cial interest exemption from basic antitrust principles. 
IX. REFUTING THE RESISTANCE
 This part recounts and refutes various arguments made by those 
who resist Leegin. Simply put, TCE undermines the central economic 
premise of Dr. Miles, namely, that minimum RPM is the equivalent 
of a naked dealer cartel. Leegin’s detractors have not carried their 
burden of articulating and supporting a substitute rationale for per se
159. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (describing so-called “codes of fair 
competition” imposed under the NIRA). 
160. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (rejecting Sherman Act and dormant 
commerce clause challenges to state-imposed raisin cartel). 
161. See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (holding that states may ban 
mergers that are lawful under federal law). 
162. See S. 75, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2011) (asserting that Leegin “incorrectly inter-
preted the Sherman Act”). 
 163. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911). 
934 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW      [Vol. 40:907 
condemnation. Instead, each such argument rests upon a rejection of 
TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both.  
A. Leegin Is Correct Even if Free Riding Is “Rare” 
 Some who resist Leegin have asserted that the sort of “free riding” 
invoked by Leegin is rare, with the result that most minimum RPM 
agreements are likely anticompetitive.164 However, Leegin does not 
depend upon the assumption that dealer free riding is common. On 
the contrary, Leegin depends upon a far weaker assumption, namely, 
that free riding is sometimes present in those industries in which 
manufacturers choose to adopt minimum RPM, thereby undermining 
Dr. Miles’s assumption that such agreements are necessarily equiva-
lent to a dealer cartel.165
 To be sure, proponents of TCE have asserted that transaction 
costs and thus market failures are “ubiquitous,” a fact confirmed by 
the very existence of firms which, according to TCE, arise to over-
come such costs and failure.166 Moreover, these scholars have con-
tended that any number of non-standard contracts can reduce trans-
action costs.167 However, Leegin only purports to apply in those 
industries where firms have adopted a particular form of non-
standard contract, namely, minimum RPM; the decision made no as-
sumption about how many firms will do so. Indeed, during the fair 
trade era, the vast majority of firms in states that adopted fair trade 
laws, which were more permissive than the rule of reason analysis 
contemplated by Leegin, declined to adopt minimum RPM.168 Section 
1 of the Sherman Act speaks only to those contracts that parties ac-
tually employ. Thus, a finding that free riding is only possible in        
164. See, e.g., Pamela Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Antitrust Con-
cerns, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 32, 44-45 (2007) (contending that the sort of free riding 
identified in Leegin occurs in “rare and narrow circumstances”); Marina Lao, Resale Price 
Maintenance: A Reassessment of its Competitive Harms and Benefits, in MORE COMMON 
GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW? 59, 73-74 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011); 
Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 7. See also Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
free riding is relatively rare (citing Robert Pitofsky, Why Dr. Miles Was Right, 8 
REGULATION 27, 29-30 (1984))); Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 
2 (invoking supposed absence of evidence that minimum RPM creates benefits); Brief of the 
American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19-20, Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (use of RPM 
to combat free riding is “not common or important”). 
165. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining Dr. Miles’s equation of min-
imum RPM and dealer cartels). 
166. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 26 (1988) (contending that 
transaction costs and resulting market failure are “ubiquitous”). 
167. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
168. See Edward S. Herman, A Statistical Note on Fair Trade, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 583, 
584 (1959) (reporting that around one percent of the nation’s manufacturers employed min-
imum RPM in fair trade states). 
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a small fraction of the nation’s industries is entirely consistent        
with Leegin.
 What if, however, we were to determine (somehow) that most in-
dustries in which minimum RPM is present are not susceptible to 
dealer free riding? Assume, for instance, that minimum RPM is pre-
sent in twenty percent of the nation’s industries, but that conditions 
conducive to free riding are only present in one quarter of them, that 
is, five percent. Surely these data would undermine Leegin.
 In fact, such data would not call Leegin into question. Full-blown 
rule of reason treatment of a category of restraints does not depend 
upon an assertion that most of the restraints in question produce 
significant benefits. Instead, as explained earlier, a category of 
agreements is unlawful per se if the agreements within the category 
necessarily have a “pernicious effect on competition” and, in addition, 
“lack . . . redeeming virtue[s].”169 Put another way, conduct is unlaw-
ful per se if, based on experience, courts determine that full-blown 
rule of reason scrutiny will “always” or “almost always” condemn 
such agreements.170 Under this formulation, which Leegin’s detrac-
tors do not seem to question, it is not enough that a restraint would 
“usually” or “probably” fail rule of reason scrutiny. Per se rules are 
stilettos, not bludgeons. 
 In any event, control of free riding is not the only possible “re-
deeming virtue” of minimum RPM. Leegin also opined that, for in-
stance, minimum RPM could create a performance bond that dealers 
would forfeit if terminated for shirking non-promotional obliga-
tions.171 Practitioners of TCE developed this rationale to explain why 
minimum RPM occurs in markets where free riding is unlikely.172
Hence, dispositive proof that free riding never occurs would not un-
dermine Leegin. Thus, this argument for restoring Dr. Miles rests 
upon a flawed understanding of TCE’s case against Dr. Miles, a mis-
application of the standard for per se illegality, or both. 
169. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (“To justify a per se prohibition a restraint must have 
‘manifestly anticompetitive effects’ and ‘lack . . . any redeeming virtue[.]’ ” (citations omit-
ted)); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 
(1985) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)); Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (same). See also supra notes 127-47 and accom-
panying text (describing the two-part per se rule developed during the inhospitality era). 
170. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Per se treatment is appropriate 
‘[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with con-
fidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.’ ” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. 
Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982))). 
171. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892. 
172. See Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free 
Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 442 (2009).  
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B. The Absence of Empirical Evidence Demonstrating that Minimum 
RPM Produces Significant Benefits Does Not Undermine Leegin
 Many scholars and officials have asserted there is not substantial 
empirical evidence supporting the claim that minimum RPM produc-
es benefits in a significant number of cases, with the result that Con-
gress and/or the states should reinstate Dr. Miles.173 However, it is 
not clear why proponents of Leegin should bear the burden of proving 
that minimum RPM produces benefits. While certain restraints are 
unreasonable per se, such summary condemnation is the rare excep-
tion, not the rule.174 Private contracts are presumptively reasonable, 
and parties seeking to void such contracts must ordinarily prove that 
such agreements produce harm.175 Finally, modern courts only con-
demn a category of restraints as unlawful per se if experience with 
rule of reason scrutiny teaches that full-blown scrutiny will always or 
almost always condemn the restraint.176 Thus, if courts were writing 
on a “clean slate,” it would seem appropriate to cast the burden of 
proof upon those who would condemn all minimum RPM agreements, 
no matter the market position of the parties, as unlawful per se.177
 Of course, courts are not writing on a clean slate; Dr. Miles was on 
the books (with substantial exceptions and qualifications) for nearly 
a century before Leegin. But this fact cuts in Leegin’s favor. After all, 
173. See, e.g., Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 6 (statement of 
Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, FTC, commenting that “[t]here still is no body of sound 
empirical economic evidence to show that minimum vertical price fixing is, on balance, 
more likely than not to benefit consumers”); id. at 7 (statement of Robert Pitofsky) (“It is 95 
years later, and they still have not come up with an iota of data, of empirical support, that 
free riders drive services out of the market, that manufacturers introduce minimum resale 
price maintenance in order to attract services. It is all Economics 101 theory.”); Lao, supra 
note 164, at 82-83 (asserting that “there is little reliable empirical evidence” regarding the 
impact of minimum RPM); Letter from 41 Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1 (“[W]e 
are not aware of any empirical study that shows enhanced consumer welfare in the form of 
services or other customer benefits. Sufficient experience with state ‘fair trade laws’ during 
the middle of the last century evidenced that consumers paid significantly more for goods 
when manufacturers could maintain prices at the retail level.”). One scholar, it should be 
noted, takes a more nuanced position, contending that the absence of such evidence is one 
factor that should cause courts to reject a “full blown” rule of reason in favor of a more hos-
tile “quick look” approach, under which such restraints are automatically presumed unlaw-
ful, thereby casting upon the defendant a burden of producing evidence that the restraint 
produces significant benefits. See Lao, supra note 164, at 85 (contending that “quick look” 
treatment is appropriate “given the absence of reliable empirical evidence on the preva-
lence and significance of RPM’s procompetitive effects”). 
174. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977). 
175. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 507 (2d Cir. 
2004) (explaining that proof of actual harm is the first step in an ordinary rule of reason 
case).
176. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
177. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (“[In Sylvania]
[w]e noted that especially in the vertical restraint context ‘departure from the rule-of-
reason standard must be based on demonstrable economic effect, rather than . . . upon for-
malistic line drawing.’ ” (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59)). 
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Dr. Miles (which itself invoked no empirical evidence), rested upon 
the purely theoretical claim that minimum RPM was indistinguisha-
ble in economic effect from a horizontal dealer cartel, that is, could 
not further any procompetitive interest, a position that numerous 
price theorists embraced during the inhospitality era.178 Such logic, of 
course, applied with equal force to non-price restraints, impelling the 
Schwinn Court to condemn such agreements, as well.179
 TCE, of course, completely undermines the theoretical equation of 
vertical restraints with analogous naked horizontal restraints. With-
out this purely theoretical premise, the logic of Dr. Miles collapses, 
thereby mandating rule of reason treatment for such restraints, un-
less proponents of per se condemnation carry their burden of estab-
lishing the sort of “demonstrable economic effect” necessary to justify 
per se condemnation.180 To be sure, those who resist Leegin have at-
tempted to make this case. They point out that minimum RPM re-
duces price competition (undeniably true—that’s the point), thereby 
satisfying the first part of the per se rule’s two-part test.181 Moreover, 
Leegin’s detractors have repeatedly invoked experience with the fair 
trade era, during which Dr. Miles was only applicable in a fraction of 
the country.182 Despite this experience with widespread fair trade, 
Leegin’s detractors say, there is no evidence that minimum          
RPM overcame free riding or otherwise furthered the interests            
of consumers.183
 However, proponents of Dr. Miles are too quick to treat the fair 
trade era as a source of data relevant to an evaluation of Leegin’s rule 
of reason. For one thing, the fair trade regime was more permissive 
of RPM than any full-blown rule of reason. As explained earlier, 
178. See Edward S. Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23, 23-24 (1955) (re-
porting that economists were in “virtually unanimous agreement” that “ ‘fair trade . . . in 
practical effect . . . nullifies the antitrust prohibitions against horizontal price fixing’ ” (ci-
tation omitted)); id. at 24 n.6 (collecting authorities for this proposition). See also supra
note 32 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (describing Schwinn’s reliance upon 
Dr. Miles). 
180. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) 
(failure of Dr. Miles’s main rationale requires reexamination of the economic foundations of 
the per se rule); Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 724 (per se condemnation depends upon 
demonstrated economic effect). 
181. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (articulating a two-part 
test for per se condemnation). 
182. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. 
183. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 4-5 (invoking 1975 Congressional 
findings based on experience during the fair trade era to support legislative reversal of 
Leegin); Letter from 41 Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1-2; Robert Pitofsky, Are Re-
tailers Who Offer Discounts Really “Knaves”?: The Coming Challenge to the Dr. Miles Rule,
21 ANTITRUST 61, 62-63 (2007) (invoking fair trade experience in support of Dr. Miles). See 
also Edward D. Cavanagh, Vertical Price Restraints After Leegin, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 1, 22-23 (2008) (contending that during the fair trade era, minimum RPM occurred in 
some industries in which conditions for dealer free riding were not present). 
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many fair trade laws authorized manufacturers to compel dealers to 
accept minimum RPM against their will.184 An era that includes nu-
merous agreements coercively imposed on unwilling retailers is not a 
useful source of data for evaluating the hypothesis that such agree-
ments are voluntary integration designed to overcome market failure 
and reduce transaction costs.185
 More fundamentally, application of fair trade immunity did not 
turn on the presence or not of free riding or any other putative bene-
fits of minimum RPM. Instead, under Miller-Tydings, states could 
immunize minimum RPM whenever: (1) the agreements were verti-
cal, and (2) there was “free and open competition”—what today we 
would call interbrand competition—between the manufacturer’s 
product and other goods.186 Absent such interbrand competition, 
states could not immunize minimum RPM, regardless of whether 
such restraints produced benefits.187 Moreover, so long as there was
such (apparent) competition—a condition courts almost always 
found—the presence of anticompetitive harm did not obviate fair 
trade immunity, even when minimum RPM was adopted throughout 
the industry.188 In these circumstances, firms could enter minimum 
RPM agreements, even agreements that would produce economic 
harm and fail Leegin’s rule of reason, with impunity, undeterred by 
any rule of reason scrutiny.189
184. See Bates, supra note 44, at 134 (reporting that ten state supreme courts had 
found non-signer provisions unconstitutional). See also supra notes 39-44 and accompany-
ing text.  
185. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.  
186. See, e.g., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1956) 
(applying language in the Miller-Tydings Act providing that states could not confer fair 
trade immunity on horizontal agreements). 
187. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1946) (reject-
ing manufacturer’s invocation of fair trade immunity because black and white film was not 
a substitute for defendant’s color film, with the result that the defendant possessed a mo-
nopoly such that there was no “free and open competition” between the manufacturer’s 
product and others). Cf. Columbia Records Inc. v. Goody, 105 N.Y.S.2d 659, 663 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1951) (finding that products were in “fair and open competition” for purpose of exemp-
tion provided under state law). 
188. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Econ. Sales Co., 127 F. Supp. 739 (D. 
Conn. 1954) (fair trade exemption applied even if dealer proved that defendant and sole 
rival charged identical prices to dealers); 1947 FTC ANN. REP. 60 (1947) (reporting that 
after Eastman Kodak, 158 F.2d at 593-94, the Commission modified its original order in-
validating minimum RPM upon finding that “free and open competition” was present after 
one firm entered a previously-monopolized market). See also Herman, supra note 178, at 
25-26 (noting that Eastman Kodak was the only decision holding that there was insuffi-
cient competition to invoke the fair trade exemption). 
189. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., 291 P.2d 945 (1955) (rejecting 
dealer’s argument that manufacturer’s excessive profits despite free and open competition 
would undermine the application of fair trade law). See infra notes 298-302 and accompa-
nying text (detailing the conditions under which minimum RPM would fail rule of reason 
scrutiny). 
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 As a result, the universe of minimum RPM agreements that arose 
under a fair trade regime differed from that which will likely arise 
under a post-Leegin rule of reason. That is, the ratio of anticompeti-
tive to procompetitive agreements was likely higher during the fair 
trade era than it will be post-Leegin. Moreover, during the fair trade 
era, parties to litigation over the application or not of state fair trade 
statutes had no reason to generate evidence about the benefits of 
such practices or whether such benefits might outweigh harms.190
While Congress repealed the fair trade laws in 1975, doing so merely 
reinstated Dr. Miles, which banned minimum RPM, without regard 
to whether such agreements produced benefits.191 As a result, mini-
mum RPM litigation focused on other issues, such as whether there 
was actually an agreement between a manufacturer and its dealers, 
whether that agreement really “fixed prices,” and whether title to the 
relevant product had in fact passed to the dealer.192
 In any event, even if fair trade regimes had treated the benefits of 
minimum RPM as pertinent, parties would have had little reason to 
investigate whether such agreements reduced free riding. Simply 
put, for most of the fair trade era, the notion of private agreements 
overcoming market failure and thus producing non-technological effi-
ciencies was foreign to the economics profession and, thus, to mem-
bers of the bar and legal academy who relied upon economic theory to 
inform antitrust analysis. The perfect competition model, with its 
numerous heroic assumptions, had a strong grip on those who ap-
plied economics to antitrust.193 To be sure, price theorists recognized 
that not all markets are perfectly competitive. Moreover, many such 
theorists studied the impact of monopoly, oligopoly, and/or monopo-
listic competition.194 Still, while these scholars recognized that some 
markets could be characterized by fewer sellers than necessary for 
190. See infra notes 275-80 and accompanying text (elaborating on the role of proof of 
benefits in overall rule of reason analysis). 
191. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (detailing the repeal of fair trade 
laws). 
192. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-28 (1988) (ar-
ticulating the definition of “price fixing” relevant for application of Dr. Miles); Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1984) (articulating the standards gov-
erning whether manufacturer and dealers had entered a price agreement); Morrison v. 
Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1436 (7th Cir. 1986) (articulating the standard for dis-
tinguishing bona fide agency agreements from sham consignment designed solely to 
achieve RPM). See also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81 
(1967) (holding that territorial restraints accomplished via consignment arrangements are 
analyzed under the rule of reason). 
193. See generally FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMICS (1995) (describing the evolution of classical economics 
and the perfect competition model). 
194. See generally EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1933); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). See also Joe 
S. Bain, Market Classifications in Modern Price Theory, 56 Q.J. ECON. 560, 569-74 (1942) 
(offering detailed taxonomy of various market structures). 
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perfect competition, they nonetheless generally retained most other 
assumptions of perfect competition when analyzing such markets.195
As I have shown elsewhere, rigorous embrace of some such assump-
tions simply precluded recognition that reliance on atomized markets 
could produce market failure and/or that private agreements could 
overcome this condition.196 Moreover, economists and then legal 
scholars did not introduce the argument that minimum RPM could 
reduce free riding until 1960, the same year (coincidentally?) that 
Ronald Coase first contended that parties could, by contract, reallo-
cate legal entitlements in a way that eliminates antecedent market 
failure.197 Thus, while minimum RPM thrived during the fair trade 
era, economists, legal scholars, and members of the antitrust bar had 
no reason to examine whether this practice was a voluntary contrac-
tual mechanism for overcoming market failure. Like other scientists, 
economists do not gather facts in a vacuum, but instead must rely 
upon some theory to inform the contours of factual inquiry.198 Given 
the state of economic theory and legal rules during most of the fair 
trade era, economists and others had no reason to ask whether open, 
notorious, and lawful minimum RPM reduced free riding or other-
wise overcame some market failure. Pre-modern astronomers may 
just as well have studied the exact contours of a (stationary) Earth’s 
“orbit” around the Sun. 
 To be sure, some early practitioners of TCE, notably Robert Bork 
and Lester Telser, embraced transaction cost reasoning during the 
1960s, but these scholars were a decided minority. Even Donald 
Turner and Richard Posner, one an economist and the other an eco-
nomically sophisticated antitrust lawyer, rejected the Telser-Bork 
view and co-authored the brief that convinced the Supreme Court to 
extend Dr. Miles and declare non-price post-sale restraints unlawful 
195. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 92, 94 (1948) (“Most [assumptions of perfect competition] are equally 
assumed in the discussion of the various ‘imperfect’ or ‘monopolistic’ markets, which 
throughout assume certain unrealistic ‘perfections.’ ”). See also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 8 (1959) (“[T]hough the 
model of [perfectly] competitive market structure is not usable as such in our definition of 
competition, other concepts of the model are.”); Meese, supra note 89, at 469 & n.47 (col-
lecting various authorities to this effect). 
 196. See Meese, supra note 50, at 70-80. 
197. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Telser, supra 
note 72. See also supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text (detailing the evolution of TCE, 
beginning with Telser’s assertion that minimum RPM could overcome market failure). 
198. See KUHN, supra note 96, at 59-61 (explaining that background expectations driv-
en by theory limit the type of data that a scientist may find); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC 
OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 107 (5th ed. 1968) (“Theory dominates the experimental work 
from its initial planning up to the finishing touches in the laboratory.”); Ronald H. Coase, 
The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229 (1984) 
(chiding institutional economists for gathering a mass of facts with no theory to guide them 
as to what was relevant). 
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per se in Schwinn.199 A 1968 article by an economist in the Harvard 
Law Review on vertical intrabrand restraints did not mention 
Telser’s work on minimum RPM and argued that courts should con-
demn all such restraints, even those imposed pursuant to a consign-
ment arrangement.200 The piece devoted three paragraphs to a rejec-
tion of the “free rider” argument propounded earlier in the decade by 
Bork, claiming that such promotion would lead to product differentia-
tion and that, if consumers really valued such services, a separate 
market would spring up to supply them.201
 Thus, TCE did not really take root until the mid-1970s, just as 
Congress repealed the fair trade laws and restored Dr. Miles by de-
fault.202 In so doing, Congress quite ironically created a legal regime 
that deprived the antitrust community of the very data Leegin’s de-
tractors claim they crave. After all, per se condemnation drives cer-
tain restraints underground, depriving scholars of the sort of judicial 
records that inform empirical investigation.203 By banning all mini-
mum RPM, then, Dr. Miles itself prevented economists from gather-
ing data about the true impact of minimum RPM, just as they were 
learning what to look for. Calls for more data ring hollow coming 
from those who support the very legal regime that prevents the ac-
quisition of such information. If more knowledge is what we want, 
full-blown rule of reason scrutiny is the best way to get it. But until 
then, proponents of Dr. Miles have simply not carried their burden   
of articulating and empirically supporting a rationale for per             
se condemnation. 
 In any event, the absence of empirical evidence has never preclud-
ed courts from adjusting rules governing restraints of trade. For in-
stance, in the early fifteenth century, English courts condemned all 
trade restraints outright, without regard to reasonableness.204 Three 
centuries later, these courts reversed course, announcing they would 
199. See Williamson, supra note 53, at 64 (describing the roles of Posner and Turner in 
preparing the government’s Schwinn brief). As explained earlier, Williamson objected to 
the brief at the time. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Comanor, supra note 50, at 1432-33 (1968). 
201. Id. at 1433. 
202. See supra note 103 (collecting authorities applying TCE reasoning to vertical re-
straints in the 1970s). 
203. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 536 (arguing that courts should examine min-
imum RPM under the rule of reason in part because “[b]oth legal policy makers and econ-
omists learn a great deal from studying the records of business litigation”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1984) (“Once a practice has 
been declared unlawful, a business is likely to defend a lawsuit by denying that it engaged 
in the practice. Rarely will it say: ‘Yes, we did that, and here is why it is economically bene-
ficial that we did.’ Judges thus are deprived of opportunities to reconsider, with the light of 
knowledge, what they decided in ignorance.”).  
204. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (“The 
inhibition against restraints of trade at common law seems at first to have had no excep-
tion.” (citing Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414) (Eng.))). 
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enforce reasonable, partial ancillary restraints.205 None of the courts 
adduced any empirical evidence in support of its conclusions, which 
instead were premised upon theory about the impact of such re-
straints. The Supreme Court described these developments with ap-
proval in Standard Oil, as did William Howard Taft in his founda-
tional Addyston Pipe opinion.206 In the same way, nineteenth-century 
American courts repeatedly emphasized that the common law of 
trade restraints was not static, but instead responsive to judicial re-
appraisal in light of what Standard Oil would later call “more accu-
rate economic conceptions.”207
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that Congress ex-
pected courts to draw upon “common law tradition” when implement-
ing the Sherman Act.208 This tradition, of course, included the author-
ity of courts to fashion antitrust doctrine without waiting for 
empirical evidence, especially when judge-created doctrines have 
themselves precluded the acquisition of such evidence! Presumably 
Congress had these decisions and their common law methodology in 
mind when it adopted a term—“restraint of trade”—laden with com-
mon law meaning and such “dynamic potential.”209
 It should come as no surprise, then, that the Supreme Court has 
itself repeatedly rejected or mandated per se condemnation without 
empirical evidence supporting its conclusions. At one time, for in-
stance, tying agreements were subject to a forgiving rule of reason, 
under which defendants could articulate benefits that justified such 
205. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711). See also Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 
280-81 (discussing these developments). 
206. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911) (“Originally all such con-
tracts were considered to be illegal, because it was deemed they were injurious to the pub-
lic as well as to the individuals who made them. In the interest of the freedom of individu-
als to contract this doctrine was modified . . . .”); Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280 (describing 
various policy considerations that led English and then American courts to abandon an 
outright ban on trade restraints). 
207. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55; Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280-81 (describing 
American developments). See also Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (“The 
decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds is the foundation of the rule in relation to the invalidity of 
contracts in restraint of trade; but as it was made under a condition of things, and a state 
of society, different from those which now prevail, the rule laid down is not regarded as in-
flexible, and has been considerably modified.” (citations omitted)). See also infra note 345 
and accompanying text (collecting state decisions to the same effect). 
208. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[Con-
gress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on 
common-law tradition. The Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law precedents long 
antedating the Sherman Act, has served that purpose. It has been used to give the Act both 
flexibility and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has remained con-
stant.”). 
209. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1998) (“The Sherman 
Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the 
common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to 
the term in 1890.”). 
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practices.210 After World War II, however, the Court declared in dicta 
that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the sup-
pression of competition” and opined that there were almost always 
less restrictive alternatives that would achieve the same objective as 
such arrangements.211 The Court cited no empirical evidence, citing 
instead a law review note and a monograph authored by a price theo-
rist.212 The note cited only the same monograph for its conclusion.213
Despite this flimsy foundation, the Court repeated this nostrum for 
decades.214 As a result, the Court declared unlawful per se any tying 
contract entered by a firm with economic power, reasoning that all 
such ties were necessarily the result of power used to impose them.215
The Court found such power in any departure from perfect competi-
tion, even asserting that the very imposition of a tie itself established 
that the defendant had economic power.216 Here again the Court of-
fered no empirical evidence supporting its assertion that ties ob-
tained by firms not in perfect competition were the result of market 
power. Nor did the Court offer any empirical support for subsequent 
adjustments in tying doctrine, including its redefinition of the type and 
quantum of economic power necessary to establish a per se violation.217
 The Court’s approach to non-price vertical restraints has been 
equally untethered to empirical support. The Schwinn Court, for in-
210. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) (declining to ban tying contracts); Pick Mfg. 
Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936) 
(sustaining a tie because the requirement could protect the manufacturer’s goodwill).  
211. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (“Tying agree-
ments serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition. The justification 
most often advanced in their defense—the protection of the good will of the manufacturer 
of the tying device—fails in the usual situation because specification of the type and quali-
ty of the product to be used in connection with the tying device is protection enough.”) This 
language was dicta because the Court was in fact evaluating an exclusive dealing contract 
between a gasoline refiner and its dealers. 
212. Id. at 306 (citing MILLER, supra note 50, at 199; Note, Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act—Coexisting Standards of Legality?, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 246 (1949)). 
213. See Note, supra note 212, at 246 n.40 (citing MILLER, supra note 50, at 199). 
214. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495 (1969); N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
215. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-16 (1984); Fortner I,
394 U.S. at 503-04. 
216. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503-04 (stating that the ability to impose a tie on an ap-
preciable number of buyers suggests that the seller has economic power); United States v. 
Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52 (1962) (holding that the possession of a copyright confers eco-
nomic power for purposes of tying doctrine). See also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 
F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a trademark conferred economic power for purpos-
es of the per se rule). 
217. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29 (holding that a market share of thirty per-
cent did not establish economic power for purposes of the per se rule despite product differ-
entiation). See also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 705 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (explaining that Jefferson Parish’s approach to defining economic power 
“doom[ed] the franchise trademark [tying] cases” that had treated any departure from per-
fect competition as sufficient to establish such power). 
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stance, offered no empirical evidence supporting the distinction it 
drew between sale and non-sale transactions.218 The best that can be 
said for the decision is that it reflected the consensus economic theory
of the time, which posited a distinction between agreements that 
reached beyond a firm and influenced the behavior of purchasers or 
suppliers, and those that controlled a firm’s own property before title 
passed.219 The former, courts and scholars said, had market power or-
igins, while the latter could produce technological efficiencies.220
 A decade later, the Court, influenced by the teachings of TCE, re-
jected this distinction, pointing out, properly, that there was no eco-
nomic rationale for treating the choice between consignment and sale 
as dispositive, with the result that the same legal standard should 
apply to both transactional forms.221 Yet, a desire for a consistent rule 
did not thereby establish the content of that rule; the Court could 
have chosen per se condemnation for both transactional forms (as the 
United States had sought in Schwinn) or, instead, rule of reason 
treatment for both.222 The Court famously chose the latter course, in 
a result that many detractors of Leegin endorse.223 However, the 
Court offered no empirical evidence that a substantial proportion of 
non-price vertical restraints in fact produce the sort of benefits that 
the Court invoked.224
 Still, the mere fact that these various developments lacked empir-
ical bases does not thereby condemn them. Supreme Court justices 
are not well-positioned to second-guess a scientific consensus. Bans 
on tying, minimum RPM, and other non-standard contracts reflected 
the mainstream view within the economics profession, driven by 
price theory, that such agreements could not produce benefits. This 
consensus informed the “reason” that Section 1 requires courts to 
218. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-83 (1967). 
219. See Meese, Intrabrand Restraints, supra note 51, at 38-49 (explaining price theo-
ry’s conclusion that restraints purporting to control purchasers after passage of title could 
not produce efficiencies and therefore had market power origins). See also supra notes 53-
64 and accompanying text. 
220. See Meese, Intrabrand Restraints, supra note 51, at 42-44.  
221. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977). Cf. Bork, 
Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 472 (“In economic analysis, a contract integration is as much 
a firm as an ownership integration. The nature of the standards applied to them through 
the Sherman Act should be the same.” (citing Coase, supra note 65, at 381)). 
222. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 50, at 1433-35 (advocating a per se ban on all such 
agreements, regardless whether title had passed). 
 223. See, e.g., Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus 
Reform of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 471 (2008) (ex-
pressing agreement with Sylvania’s rule of reason holding). 
 224. The Sylvania Court did refer to unspecified “decision[s] sustaining vertical re-
strictions under the rule of reason” as evidence that such restraints produce “redeeming 
virtues.” See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54. The absence of any citation of such cases or explana-
tion of the test these courts employed makes it difficult to evaluate this evidence. 
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bring to bear on antitrust problems.225 The very same sort of consen-
sus still drives the Court’s per se ban on naked horizontal price fix-
ing, a ban not found in pre-Sherman Act common law.226 No Supreme 
Court decision invokes empirical evidence that such price fixing produc-
es harm; the case is purely theoretical and, so far as we know, correct. 
 In any event, the demand for empirical evidence by Leegin’s de-
tractors is difficult to square with their continuing support for Dr. 
Miles. That decision, after all, rested upon the purely theoretical con-
clusion—now known to be false—that minimum RPM is analogous to 
a dealer cartel.227 Absent a “demonstrable showing” that minimum 
RPM nonetheless satisfies the criteria for per se treatment, a showing 
Leegin’s detractors have not made, continued resistance to Leegin
constitutes a rejection of TCE and/or a rejection of basic antitrust 
principles, such as the two-part test for per se illegality. 
C. The Purported Availability of So-Called “Less Restrictive             
Alternatives” Does Not Undermine Leegin
 Proponents of per se condemnation frequently contend that manu-
facturers can achieve RPM’s legitimate objectives by so-called “less 
restrictive alternatives,” that is, practices that combat dealer free rid-
ing or achieve other objectives without setting resale prices. For in-
stance, one scholar claims that manufacturers can instead design and 
pay for advertising themselves, or provide promotional allowances to 
dealers that do advertise.228 Failing this, he says, manufacturers can 
rely upon non-price restraints such as territorial restraints that 
“close[]” distribution and thus encourage dealer promotion.229 Twen-
ty-seven states and some scholars have even argued that manufac-
turers can simply stipulate by contract the type of promotion desired 
and pay dealers separately for it.230
225. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
226. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 23-24 (1990) (articulat-
ing a per se ban on price fixing regardless of reasonableness); HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 
at 63-64 (explaining that pre-Sherman Act common law enforced horizontal agreements 
setting reasonable prices); id. at 178-79 (detailing the economic rationale for a ban on price 
fixing). 
227. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
228. See Grimes, supra note 223, at 491-94. 
229. Id. at 492-93. 
230. See Amended States’ Comments Urging Denial of Nine West’s Petition at 9, In re
Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/comments/ninewestgrp.080117statesamendedcomments.pdf (“The manufacturer could 
require its distributors to provide services as a matter of contract and even pay separately 
for those services. In that circumstance, the manufacturer could terminate or threaten to 
terminate the relationship if the retailer did not live up to those obligations. That alterna-
tive way of fostering services for consumers is more effective and efficient than [minimum 
RPM].”); Cavanagh, supra note 183, at 22-23 (identifying separate contracting as a less re-
strictive alternative); Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 445 (“The most obvious [less restrictive 
alternative] is simply to require dealers, as a condition of retaining their dealerships, to 
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 The universal or near-universal presence of such alternatives can 
bolster the case for per se illegality, by suggesting that defendants 
can always achieve the benefits achieved via minimum RPM while 
allowing dealers at least nominal pricing discretion.231 One could ar-
gue that the widespread availability of such alternatives signals that 
“rule of reason [analysis] will [always] condemn” minimum RPM, 
thereby justifying per se condemnation.232
 The invocation of less restrictive alternatives to justify per se con-
demnation of minimum RPM is not new. Price theorists hostile to 
non-standard agreements have been making this argument for dec-
ades. Indeed, ironically, many once invoked the prospect of less re-
strictive alternatives to justify per se condemnation of various non-
price restraints of the sort that some of Leegin’s detractors now in-
voke as alternatives for minimum RPM. For instance, Donald Turner 
once argued that exclusive territories should be unlawful per se, giv-
en the purported presence of less restrictive alternatives.233 He had 
previously made the same argument with respect to tying con-
tracts.234 Derek Bok, then a colleague of Turner’s at Harvard Law 
School, argued that less restrictive alternatives would satisfy any le-
provide the desired services.”); Pitofsky, supra note 183, at 63 (“[I]f the manufacturer really 
has in mind particular services, the common commercial practice is to contract separately 
for them with the retailer, i.e., advertising support, warranty programs, and so forth. 
Those opposing per se rules in this area implicitly assume that the manufacturer knows 
better than the retailer or the market what will or will not work in the marketplace.”). 
231. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 25 n.42 (1984) (in-
voking the availability of purportedly less restrictive alternatives as a rationale for the per 
se rule); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) (same); Turner, 
Tying Arrangements, supra note 50, at 59-60 (same). See also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets 
the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
71-72 (1997) (describing so-called “categorical balancing” whereby the supposed presence of 
less restrictive alternatives justifies a per se ban on tying contracts, even though such con-
tracts sometimes produce benefits).
232. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (opining that “[p]er se treatment is 
appropriate” when courts are confident that rule of reason scrutiny of restraints in ques-
tion will result in condemnation) (citations omitted). Such an argument would depend upon 
the methodology for establishing a prima facie case, however. For instance, if courts 
deemed such restraints “inherently suspect,” such that the mere existence of such agree-
ments established a prima facie case, then one could predict that rule of reason analysis 
would always condemn them. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999) 
(opining that certain restraints are inherently anticompetitive and thus presumptively un-
reasonable). If instead courts required plaintiffs to prove actual anticompetitive harm to 
establish a prima facie case, it would be more difficult to conclude that rule of reason anal-
ysis will always or almost always condemn such agreements. 
233. See Turner, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 50, at 699 (explaining that the re-
quirement that the dealer use its best efforts within an area of “primary responsibility” will 
assure effective promotion by dealers). See also Christopher D. Stone, Closed Territorial 
Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 286, 313-14 
(1963) (contending that less restrictive alternatives would achieve the same objective and 
thus widen distribution of goods and reduce prices). 
 234. Turner, Tying Arrangements, supra note 50, at 59-60. 
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gitimate objectives of exclusive dealing agreements.235 Subsequently, 
scholars contended that there were less restrictive means of achiev-
ing the legitimate objectives of location clauses or horizontal alloca-
tions of territories ancillary to a wealth-producing joint venture.236
 For almost as long, however, proponents of TCE have been offer-
ing rebuttals of such arguments. These rebuttals confirm that sup-
port for less restrictive alternatives depends upon outmoded price-
theoretic assumptions, a misunderstanding of TCE’s rationales for 
vertical restraints, or both. For instance, more than four decades be-
fore Leegin, Robert Bork responded to the claim that manufacturers 
could achieve the same benefits as exclusive territories by adopting 
so-called “areas of primary responsibility.”237 Such provisions would 
require dealers to promote optimally the manufacturer’s product 
within a certain territory, but without preventing dealers from also 
serving each other’s primary territories.238 Bork admitted that such 
provisions could, in theory, achieve the same promotional invest-
ments as an exclusive territory.239 At the same time, he rebutted the 
claim that such alternatives would work in the real world. His rebut-
tal, which rests upon transaction cost considerations, is worth quot-
ing at length. 
The area-of-primary-responsibility clause . . . permits selling 
across territorial lines and thereby makes it less profitable for re-
sellers to engage in local sales effort. The resellers’ interests then 
diverge from the manufacturer’s. The manufacturer must, there-
fore, know what degree of local sales effort is optimal in each re-
seller’s territory and must assiduously police each reseller to see 
that he expends, against his own interest, the effort desired. This 
solution is obviously not satisfactory.  
It would be extraordinarily costly for the manufacturer to 
learn at first hand the real sales potential of every dealer’s area 
and just how and where each dealer’s sales effort should be ex-
 235. Bok, supra note 50, at 307-08 (concluding that parties could always achieve legit-
imate objectives of exclusive dealing contracts by simply terminating shirking dealers). 
236. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 48-49, Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15) (contending that less restrictive means would produce the same 
benefits as location clauses); SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 386 (same); Robert Pitofsky, A
Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 911-12 (1985) 
(contending that less restrictive alternatives could produce same benefits as horizontal an-
cillary exclusive territories). 
237. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 465-69. See also White Motor Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-72 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (offering this alternative to 
exclusive territories); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,409, at 
71,753 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (approving a consent decree permitting areas of primary responsi-
bility as an alternative to exclusive territories). 
238. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 467-68 (describing the operation of such 
provisions). 
239. Id. at 467 (“Such clauses do, however, permit the manufacturer to demand of the 
dealer the amount of local sales effort which the manufacturer considers optimum.”). 
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pended. Since the dealer who is required to undertake unremuner-
ative tasks can hardly be relied upon to identify all such tasks so 
that they may be imposed upon him, the manufacturer will have to 
integrate partially into the dealer level to make the survey the 
dealer is not motivated to make. This survey, moreover, cannot be 
made once for all time. Changes in population, income, tastes, 
products, and other factors will continually alter sales potential. 
The manufacturer will, therefore, have to be in as constant contact 
with local markets as all of his dealers combined. This procedure is 
probably so costly in most cases that the manufacturer will not do 
the job completely. Instead, he will rely upon inaccurate indicia 
such as whether the dealer comes up to the dealer average in sales 
to areas containing similar populations. . . . Market division, which 
gives each dealer the incentive to cultivate his area as intensively 
as is worthwhile from the point of both the dealer and the manu-
facturer, eliminates all the extra costs and inaccuracies of an at-
tempt to enforce an area-of-primary-responsibility clause.240
 In short, the “primary responsibility” approach would be a perfect 
alternative in a price-theoretic world, where manufacturers could 
costlessly gather information about the preferences of consumers, 
costlessly determine appropriate promotional strategies for each ter-
ritory, costlessly communicate those strategies to dealers, and then 
costlessly monitor whether, in fact, dealers complied with these di-
rectives. However, as Bork implicitly realized, the real world is beset 
with numerous types of information costs, costs that would make 
such a strategy a non-starter. By contrast, exclusive territories would 
allow manufacturers to avoid such costs while at the same time har-
nessing the expertise of local dealers, who presumably know far more 
about local preferences and how to tailor appropriate promotional 
strategies than a functionary at corporate headquarters. As Bork 
would expressly note in a subsequent article, exclusive territories 
and minimum RPM, while granted by contract, can function as the 
economic equivalent of property rights, ensuring that dealers inter-
nalize the full costs and benefits of their promotional activities and 
thereby aligning dealers and manufacturers’ incentives.241
240. Id. at 468.  
241. See Bork, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 77, at 956 (“R.p.m., like vertical 
market division, is the means by which the manufacturer induces reseller provision of [in-
formation] by making sure that the reseller can recover the [information’s] cost. The pro-
cess is closely analogous to the social recognition of property rights as a means of inducing 
economic activities. Contract law delegates to private persons the power to create property 
rights because of their superior knowledge of the efficiencies to be gained in particular sit-
uations. R.p.m. is best viewed as an instance of this general principle. The net effect of 
r.p.m. is to increase the amount of an existing product (or, more accurately, to enlarge the 
information component, for example, of a composite product consisting of a physical item 
and information about the item) which is offered to consumers.”). See also Marvel, supra 
note 137, at 2-4; Meese, supra note 137, at 600-07. 
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 Similar considerations require rejection of the claim by Leegin’s
detractors that less restrictive alternatives will serve the same objec-
tive as minimum RPM. Consider, for instance, the most prevalent 
claim, namely, that manufacturers can simply contract for the type of 
promotional services they desire, an alternative that opponents of 
various vertical restraints have been advancing for decades.242 As 
Bork and other scholars have explained, this approach would make 
perfect sense if the cost of bargaining and acquiring information was 
zero, as the perfect competition model assumes.243 In this case, manu-
facturers could readily ascertain just how susceptible each dealer’s 
customers were to various forms of promotion, tailor a promotional 
strategy for each dealer, and then (costlessly) negotiate contracts ob-
ligating each dealer to engage in optimal promotion, at whatever 
price the parties (costlessly) agree to. Manufacturers would then 
(costlessly) monitor each dealer, terminating dealers who did not 
comply. But of course, as TCE taught us, bargaining and information 
costs are not zero, but instead can be quite significant, particularly in 
franchisor-franchisee relationships. Relegating manufacturers to 
these alternatives will increase the cost of distribution and/or reduce 
the effectiveness of promotion. 
 More fundamentally, most arguments for less restrictive alterna-
tives misconceive the nature of the interest served by minimum RPM 
and, for that matter, exclusive territories. Take again the claim that 
manufacturers can simply tell dealers how, when, and where to pro-
mote the manufacturer’s product and then terminate those dealers 
that do not comply.244 Invocation of this alternative sets up manufac-
turers as central planners, who know the exact promotional strategy 
that each dealer should employ. However, if manufacturers believed 
themselves capable of such planning, they could take on the task of 
distribution themselves, determining optimal promotional strategies 
and directing employee-dealers to execute such strategies. As TCE 
has taught us, a manufacturer’s decision to rely upon the market to 
accomplish a particular task is not exogenous, but depends upon the 
242. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (describing this view by several of 
Leegin’s detractors). 
243. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 187 (contending that less restrictive alterna-
tives often increase the cost of policing and preventing dealer opportunism). See also Bork, 
Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 467-68; Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance 
Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 78 (1994) (“The ques-
tion, however, is not whether alternatives exist but whether they are superior to the verti-
cal restraints they replace, either from the standpoint of economic efficiency or of competi-
tion. This is not an easy standard to meet . . . .”); Meese, supra note 137, at 589-92 
(explaining how manufacturers rely on dealers because the cost of planning promotional 
decisions is prohibitively high, contrary to the assumptions of price theory). 
244. See supra note 230 (collecting scholarly authorities asserting that such supervi-
sion of dealers’ promotional decisions is a less restrictive means of assuring appropriate 
promotion). 
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relative cost of such reliance, on the one hand, and the alternative of 
complete vertical integration, on the other.245 Manufacturers who 
adopt minimum RPM have by hypothesis chosen to rely upon inde-
pendent dealers to distribute their products, presumably because 
they do not want to take on the task of making promotional decisions 
for each and every location where the manufacturer’s product is 
sold.246 Unlike employees, who presumably earn fixed wages, such 
dealers can earn a profit and thus can at least potentially capture the 
full benefits of any promotional investment they make.247 By relying 
upon the market to distribute their products, manufacturers can en-
trust promotional determinations to independent for-profit dealers 
with both the incentive and local knowledge to discover optimal pro-
motional tactics.248 Armed with this discretion, different dealers 
might employ different strategies, depending upon the nature of the 
local consumer population and the myriad of evolving factors that 
Bork identified.249 For instance, a dealer in a locality full of retirees 
might rely heavily on newspaper and radio advertisements. A dealer 
in a locality with a young population might rely on social media and 
other forms of internet advertising. A dealer in a college town may 
vary its strategy depending upon whether school is in session. 
 A manufacturer can perfect this decentralized and dealer-centric 
system of distribution by employing minimum RPM to confer upon 
dealers the equivalent of a property right in the fruits of their promo-
tional efforts.250 That is, by assigning individuals ownership in the 
fruits of their investments, this contractual property can transform a 
public good—promotional information—into a private good and 
thereby ensure optimal provision.251 The alternative of reliance upon 
manufacturer planning and resulting payment for promotional ser-
 245. See Coase, supra note 65, passim.
 246. See Meese, supra note 137, at 589-92. 
247. Id. at 590-91. 
248. Id. at 595-98. 
 249. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 467-68. 
250. See Bork, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 77, at 956. See also Marvel, supra
note 137, at 2-4; Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Re-
lation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 193 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Re-
straints] (“[R]eliance upon payments for individual services will attenuate the benefits of a 
dealer system of distribution. Presumably, different classes of dealers face customers with 
different service needs [and] granting each dealer an exclusive territory would allow for 
dealer-by-dealer decision making about the appropriate mix of various presale and postsale 
services. . . . [By contrast,] individualized negotiation . . . would eliminate the benefits of 
relying upon dealers' judgment as to the appropriate mix of services to provide . . . .” (foot-
note omitted)); Meese, supra note 137, at 595-98. 
 251. See Meese, supra note 137, at 600-07. See generally R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in 
Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974). 
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vices serves an entirely different interest, and one only useful in a 
price-theoretic world.252
 252. Some of Leegin’s detractors claim that dealers protected by minimum RPM may 
choose not to promote the manufacturer’s product, thereby “pocketing” the additional mar-
gin between the retail price and the cost of the product. See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 223, 
at 477; Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 446-47. Some also contend that dealers may employ 
the extra margins to invest in dealer-specific quality improvements instead of promotion. 
See id.
 The first critique apparently assumes, without justification, that demand for the 
manufacturer’s product is exogenous and thus unrelated to promotional investments. In 
such circumstances, dealers may well have no reason to promote the manufacturer’s prod-
uct. If, however, there is stiff interbrand competition, including from vertically integrated 
manufacturers, dealers that fail to promote the manufacturer’s product will attract fewer 
sales at the stipulated price, so long as dealers of other products are themselves engaging 
in promotion or if products sold by those dealers have such a strong enough reputation that 
they “sell themselves.” Cf. Telser, supra note 72, at 95 (explaining that, over time, heavily-
promoted products may gain sufficient public acceptance to obviate the need for additional 
promotion). In such an environment, dealers governed by minimum RPM may have little 
choice but to engage in promotion to protect their sales against inroads by interbrand ri-
vals. See Meese, supra note 137, at 617-18 (explaining that product differentiation and re-
sulting consumer demand for a manufacturer’s product is not exogenous but instead de-
pends upon promotion in an environment characterized by interbrand competition). 
 Indeed, a little game theory will illustrate this point. Assume two sets of dealers, one 
set selling Fords and one set selling Toyotas. Assume that both manufacturers adopt min-
imum RPM as a means of granting their dealers property rights over the results of their 
promotional efforts, with the result that dealers only face interbrand competition. Assume 
further that, taken together, dealers would (as these critics implicitly assume) maximize 
their joint welfare by declining to invest in promotion, but that the Sherman Act forbids 
such interbrand collusion. Finally, assume that, if a dealer of one product (say Fords) de-
clines to invest in promotion while the dealer of the other product (say Toyotas) does, the 
promoting dealer will gain significant sales at the expense of the non-promoting dealer. 
 Given these assumptions, we can model dealer decisionmaking with the following 
normal form game illustrated by a two-by-two table. There are four possible strategy com-
binations, each of which provides particular payoffs to each dealer, as illustrated. (The 
payoffs for the Ford dealers are the first number in each combination.) 
                                               TOYOTA  
                                                  Don’t Promote       Promote 
F
O         Don’t Promote                     50, 50                25, 60   
R
D         Promote                               60, 25                30, 30      
 As the table shows, the two dealers would maximize their joint welfare by agreeing 
not to promote (the upper left-hand cell), reducing their costs and reaping whatever sales 
that would nonetheless result, perhaps as a result of the manufacturer’s own promotional 
efforts. Absent such an (unlawful) agreement, however, each dealer would have to choose 
its promotional strategy without knowledge of the strategy chosen by the other. Moreover, 
given the (plausible) payoffs illustrated by this chart, each dealer would have a dominant 
strategy, that is, a strategy that maximizes its payoff regardless of whether the rival dealer 
chooses to promote or not. In particular, each dealer would have a dominant strategy of 
promoting and thus would choose that strategy, leading to a (non-cooperative) Nash equi-
librium, the lower right-hand cell on the chart. (The result is a Nash equilibrium because 
neither party would gain by choosing a different strategy, given the strategy chosen by the 
other.) While the result would not maximize the joint welfare of the dealers, the resulting 
increase in sales would presumably increase the welfare of consumers and manufacturers. 
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 Minimum RPM is not the only method of creating such a property 
right. As Bork and others have argued, contractually granted exclu-
sive territories can also create such a right.253 But this does not estab-
lish that exclusive territories and minimum RPM are always inter-
changeable. For instance, in some cases, the nature of the product, 
promotional technology, and consumer base might be such that 
granting dealers meaningful exclusive territories will result in inad-
equate promotion. Moreover, granting exclusive territories may actu-
ally reduce intrabrand competition more than minimum RPM, as the 
latter simply sets a minimum price, while the former grants dealers 
local quasi-monopolies that may allow them to price well above the 
price that a minimum RPM regime might set. Finally, in some cir-
cumstances, manufacturers might find it easier to monitor the price 
that a dealer is charging than to determine whether a dealer is ad-
vertising or otherwise soliciting customers outside an assigned territory. 
 It should also be noted that the practical size of an exclusive terri-
tory may be exogenous to the distributional needs of manufacturers, 
with the result that exclusive territories cannot serve as effective 
contractual property rights. Dealers often advertise on local televi-
sion, radio, and in local newspapers. The coverage of these outlets is 
fixed by interaction between the technology of media production and 
the nature and dispersion of the local population. In Chicago, for in-
stance, newspaper, radio, and television advertising serves up to 2.7 
million individuals.254 It is not clear how a manufacturer could con-
fine a dealer to a geographic subset of this market, given that a radio 
advertisement that reaches the South Side will also reach the North 
Side and vice versa. Moreover, reliance upon a single dealer to serve 
a population so varied and widely dispersed may sacrifice the bene-
fits of localized dealer knowledge that practitioners of TCE have em-
phasized.255 Finally, dealers may experience diseconomies of scale, 
with the result that reliance upon a single dealer will increase the 
average cost of distribution. For these and other reasons, a manufac-
turer may wish to locate more than one dealer in such a locality, 
See generally DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6-49 (1994) (describing 
normal form games and the concept of Nash equilibrium). 
 The fear that dealers will attempt to attract customers via non-promotional competi-
tion does not undermine the claim that minimum RPM will enhance promotion. Manufac-
turers can simply forbid dealers from engaging in certain forms of non-price rivalry. More-
over, promotional and non-promotional investments are not mutually exclusive; nothing 
about minimum RPM, which creates a price floor, prevents dealers from making both sorts 
of investments. Indeed, the whole point of contractual property rights is to empower dealers 
to attract sales. Manufacturers may be indifferent to how dealers accomplish this objective. 
253. See Marvel, supra note 137, at 2; Meese, supra note 137, at 600-02. 
254. See State and County Quick Facts: Chicago, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html (last updated June 27, 2013, 2:00 
PM) (reporting 2012 Chicago metropolitan area population of 2.714 million). 
255. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. 
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thereby rendering reliance upon an exclusive territory impractical 
and less effective than minimum RPM. 
 In sum, the less restrictive alternatives that Leegin’s detractors 
have identified are either less effective, more costly, or both. As Oli-
ver Williamson noted long ago, different distributional settings may 
pose different problems and thus call for different solutions.256 Schol-
ars and advocates who embrace such alternatives have simply substi-
tuted price theory for TCE, thereby rejecting four decades of advanc-
es in economic science. 
D.   Proof that Minimum RPM Resulted in Higher Retail Prices    
During the Fair Trade Era Does Not Undermine Leegin
 Some who resist Leegin emphasize that minimum RPM results in 
higher retail prices than would prevail if the practice were unlawful, 
as evidenced by the impact of minimum RPM during the fair trade 
era.257 For some, this evidence strengthens the case for per se con-
demnation.258 For others it supports a hostile “quick look” rule of rea-
son, whereby the mere existence of minimum RPM imposes a burden 
on a defendant to prove that the practice produces significant bene-
fits.259 Some of these same advocates treat such evidence as a chal-
lenge to proponents of Leegin to adduce evidence that, as a global 
matter, the benefits of minimum RPM outweigh its harms.260 In fact, 
legislation proposed in 2011 relied in part upon legislative findings 
that minimum RPM led to higher prices during the fair trade era and 
that post-Leegin minimum RPM will likely increase retail prices.261
 This argument is intuitively appealing. After all, Standard Oil’s
rule of reason bans contracts that produce monopoly or its conse-
quences, and the most obvious consequence of monopoly is higher 
prices that result from an exercise of market power and concomitant 
 256. WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 48-49. 
257. See, e.g., Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 4-5 (invoking previous Con-
gressional findings that minimum RPM led to higher retail prices in “fair trade” states); 
Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1 (“[E]mpirical studies show 
that agreements on minimum resale prices raise consumer prices, often significantly.”); 
Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 431-32 (discussing empirical evidence that minimum RPM 
increases retail prices); Lao, supra note 164, at 67 (“A troubling fact about RPM is that vir-
tually all studies show it leads to higher consumer prices.”); id. at 67 n.54 (collecting cita-
tions of various studies reaching this conclusion). 
258. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 4-7; Letter from 41 State Attor-
neys General, supra note 149, at 1-2. 
259. See Kirkwood, supra note 155, passim; Lao, supra note 164, at 84-85; See also in-
fra Part IX.E (discussing and refuting arguments for such an approach).  
260. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 1 (invoking supposed paucity of 
evidence that the benefits of minimum RPM outweigh the harms presumed because of evi-
dence of higher prices); Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1-2 
(same). 
261. See S. 75, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(3)-(5) (2011).  
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output reduction.262 It would therefore seem that evidence that min-
imum RPM results in higher prices would support the repudiation   
of Leegin or, at least, a strong presumption that minimum RPM            
is unreasonable. 
 Not so fast. In fact, proof that minimum RPM results in prices 
that are higher than those in a competitive market is unremarkable 
and does not support hostile treatment of minimum RPM, either 
globally or in a particular case. Market power entails the ability prof-
itably to reduce output and raise prices above the competitive level, 
namely, cost plus a reasonable rate of return.263 Thus, not all practic-
es resulting in higher prices reflect an exercise of such power. For in-
stance, a firm that enhances the quality of its product by investing 
additional resources in the production process will incur higher costs 
and, if the product is successful, charge higher prices resulting from 
enhanced demand. In the same way, a firm that enters a contract 
with an expensive advertising firm to develop a new marketing cam-
paign will, if successful, enhance demand and thus price for the 
firm’s (now more expensive) product. While both of these practices (if 
successful) raise prices, neither necessarily results in prices above 
cost. Jaguar did not violate the Sherman Act when it retained Ster-
ling, Cooper, Draper Price.264
 Leegin detractors who invoke evidence that minimum RPM re-
sults in higher retail prices implicitly assume that the pre-RPM price 
is “competitive” and accurately reflects the “costs” of producing and 
distributing the manufacturer’s products. Such an approach makes 
perfect sense within the price theory paradigm, which assumes away 
transaction costs and presumes that all efficiencies are technological 
in nature.265 In such a world, efficiencies would necessarily manifest 
themselves as reduced production costs and thus lower prices.266
TCE, however, gives us reason to doubt this assumption. TCE asserts 
that transaction costs are ubiquitous, with the result that reliance 
upon an unfettered market to distribute a product may well result in 
a market failure, including dealer free riding.267 If so, the resulting 
prices will not be “competitive” in any meaningful sense, but will in-
stead reflect suboptimal costs of promotion, a suboptimal demand for 
the manufacturer’s product, and thus a suboptimal equilibrium of 
262. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911) (detailing harmful 
consequences of monopoly as higher prices, reduced output, or reduced quality). 
263. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291-93 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(finding that prices exceeding cost plus a normal rate of return were unreasonable), aff’d as 
modified by 175 U.S. 211 (1899); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981). 
264. See Mad Men: The Other Woman (AMC television broadcast May 27, 2012). 
265. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
266. See Meese, supra note 89, at 480-81. 
 267. See supra Part VI. 
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price and output.268 If successful, minimum RPM and/or other meth-
ods of counteracting this market failure will result in increased ex-
penditures on promotion, increased demand for the manufacturer’s 
product, and thus higher prices. Far from indicating that market 
power is afoot, such price effects merely confirm that the manufac-
turer’s strategy is effective, as reflected in consumers’ enhanced will-
ingness to pay for the product in question.269 As Ronald Coase put it 
four decades ago, non-standard practices, while apparently re-
strictive of competition, are often necessary for “bringing about a         
competitive situation.”270
 To drive this point home, it is useful to consider the “less restric-
tive alternatives” that Leegin’s detractors have applauded, such as 
non-price restraints and separate contracting for promotional ser-
vices desired by the manufacturer.271 As explained above, such provi-
sions are often less effective and more costly than minimum RPM.272
Let us assume the contrary, however, that such provisions will result 
268. See Meese, supra note 89, at 514-19 (explaining that, where transaction costs and 
resulting market failure are present, pre-restraint prices may not reflect “competitive” 
equilibrium). 
269. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984) 
(characterizing product differentiation resulting from horizontal limitation on rivalry as 
procompetitive). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of 
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 156 (1984); Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 147-61 
(explaining that proof that an ancillary restraint results in prices higher than the status 
quo ante may reflect benefits of the restraint).  
 Some have claimed that Sylvania’s invocation of “interbrand competition” as an 
overriding concern of antitrust law was novel. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 
149, at 7 (asserting that Sylvania’s endorsement of interbrand competition was a “bald 
proposition”); Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1425, 1486 (characterizing this invocation as “unsupported”). To be sure, Syl-
vania cited no authority for this proposition. However, antitrust courts have recognized the 
overriding importance of interbrand competition since the late 1890s. For instance, cove-
nants ancillary to the formation of a partnership often prevent partners from engaging in 
(intrabrand) competition with the partnership. However, in Addyston Pipe, William How-
ard Taft opined such restraints “were to be encouraged,” because they forced partners to 
devote their undivided efforts to enhancing the business of the partnership, which, of 
course, furthered what modern courts would call interbrand competition. United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211 
(1899). See also Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 380-83 (explaining Taft’s reasoning in 
transaction cost terms). Indeed, as explained previously, even Schwinn invoked the im-
portance of interbrand competition, when holding that non-price vertical restraints includ-
ed in consignment agreements could be reasonable. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967). 
 Another scholar, who endorses Sylvania, nonetheless claims that intrabrand re-
straints may reduce interbrand competition by “creat[ing] incentives for dealers to push a 
product regardless of its underlying merits” and causing dealers to “resort to image appeals 
that have nothing to do with a product's merits.” See Grimes, supra note 223, at 472. How-
ever, this concern does not seem to justify a distinction between price and non-price re-
straints, both of which can encourage such conduct by dealers. 
270. See Coase, supra note 70, at 67-68. 
271. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text. 
272. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text. 
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in optimal promotion. If effective, such promotion will, like the pro-
motion induced by minimum RPM, increase each individual dealer’s 
costs and also enhance demand for the manufacturer’s product. The 
result will be higher retail prices, as some of Leegin’s detractors have 
admitted.273 And yet, so far as this author is aware, none of Leegin’s
detractors would ban all non-price vertical restraints or all contracts 
that specify a dealer’s promotional duties. While such agreements re-
sult in higher prices, such increases are equally consistent with a 
beneficial explanation of the restraint, as Leegin itself recognized.274
 As a result, proof that minimum RPM results in prices that are 
higher than the status quo ante does not establish or suggest that the 
practice is predominantly anticompetitive and thus properly subject 
to per se condemnation or even hostile rule of reason treatment. After 
all, agreements are only per se unlawful if courts can be confident 
that rule of reason scrutiny will always or almost always condemn 
them.275 Such proof, therefore, would not by itself give rise to a prima
facie case under the rule of reason.276 Thus, even proof that all such 
restraints result in higher prices than would prevail in an atomistic 
market does not provide confidence that the rule of reason would 
condemn such agreements. 
 Arguments to the contrary seem to conflate the absence of falsifi-
cation of a theory with confirmation of that theory. Yes, proof that 
minimum RPM results in higher prices is consistent with an anti-
competitive account of such agreements. However, such proof is just 
as consistent with TCE’s presumption that such agreements are pro-
competitive.277 In both cases “consistency” merely denotes the absence 
of falsification, that is, the failure to refute the proposed theory.278
Such a lack of falsification—consistency with observed data—merely 
273. See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 223, at 484 (noting, in passing, that alternatives can 
also increase prices as much as a challenged restraint). Some Leegin detractors contend 
that minimum RPM can reduce the overall welfare of consumers because some consumers 
do not value the resulting promotion for which they nonetheless pay a higher price. See
Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 437-38. However, one can level the same critique against any 
practice that induces additional promotion. 
274. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96 
(2007). See also Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 144-61. 
275. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
276. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95 
(1986) (holding that evidence that is equally consistent with procompetitive and anticom-
petitive objectives cannot by itself support an inference of anticompetitive harm); Monsan-
to Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S 752, 761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat’l Bank of 
Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270 (1968) (same). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (stating that legal presumptions 
employed in antitrust litigation should rest on actual market realities and not implausible 
economic theories). 
277. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing TCE’s presumption that 
non-standard agreements are beneficial). 
278. See POPPER, supra note 198, at 265-66. 
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saves the theory from oblivion. It does not “prove” it.279 Thus, Leegin’s
proponents may just as well invoke the very same evidence             
to “establish” a case that minimum RPM is generally or even             
always procompetitive. 
 There is, however, one sort of evidence that could perhaps falsify 
one of these hypotheses, namely, proof of minimum RPM’s impact on 
output.280 After all, the exercise of market power reduces output be-
low the competitive level and results in above-cost pricing. If, by con-
trast, minimum RPM induces effective promotion of the manufactur-
er’s product, demand for the product will rise, thereby inducing 
increased output. However, none of Leegin’s detractors has offered 
evidence that, say, adoption of the fair trade laws resulted in reduced 
output in states in which defendants practiced minimum RPM, focus-
ing instead upon the propensity of minimum RPM to raise prices 
above the atomistic level. In so doing, they have clung to price theory 
and rejected TCE, which established that price increases are equally 
consistent with a beneficial account of such restraints.  
E.   Minimum RPM Is Not an “Inherently Suspect” Practice that   
Merits a “Quick Look” Analysis 
 Ordinarily, rejection of per se condemnation results in scrutiny 
under a full-blown rule of reason.281 Under this test, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that a restraint produces anticompetitive harm to estab-
lish a prima facie case.282 Failure to establish such harm entitles the 
defendant to judgment.283 If the plaintiff establishes such harm, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the restraint 
produces the sort of “redeeming virtue[s]” the defendant identified 
when avoiding per se condemnation.284
 Very rarely, however, courts employ a “quick look” rule of rea-
son.285 Under this approach, the mere existence of a restraint deemed 
279. Id. at 266 (“But compatibility alone [with data] must not make us attribute to the 
theory a positive degree of corroboration: the mere fact that a theory has not yet been falsi-
fied can obviously not be regarded as sufficient.”). 
280. Cf. Lambert, supra note 148, at 1941-42 (contending that proof that minimum 
RPM reduced output should establish prima facie case against it under a “structured rule 
of reason”). 
281. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (endorsing 
fact-intensive rule of reason scrutiny for non-price vertical restraints). 
282. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Applying 
the rule of reason, we first look to see ‘whether [the plaintiff] has demonstrated “actual 
detrimental effects” or “the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition” [via proof 
of market power].’ ”).
283. See, e.g., E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 28-29 & n.3 
(2d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of Section 1 complaint because plaintiff did not allege 
market-wide harm). 
284. See Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 825-26. 
285. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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“inherently suspect” establishes a prima facie case, casting upon the 
defendant a burden of producing evidence that the restraint creates 
benefits.286 Failure to discharge this burden dooms the restraint.287
Moreover, even if the defendant does adduce such evidence, the 
plaintiff can still prevail by showing that a less restrictive alternative 
would have produced the same benefits.288
 After Leegin, both scholars and enforcement officials articulated a 
structured rule of reason applicable to vertical restraints.289 Under 
one such approach, for instance, plaintiffs challenging minimum 
RPM would bear the initial burden of proving that the challenged re-
straint resulted in reduced output or, in the alternative, that struc-
tural market conditions are such that minimum RPM can reduce 
economic welfare by, for instance, facilitating a cartel between manu-
facturers.290 Consistent with both TCE and language in Leegin, such 
approaches require plaintiffs to do more than simply prove that min-
imum RPM resulted in higher prices than the status quo ante.291
 However, numerous scholars, one think tank, and twenty-seven 
states have argued that, despite Leegin, minimum RPM is “inherent-
ly suspect” and thus deserves “quick look” analysis.292 There are two 
mutually reinforcing flavors of this argument. First, some offer this 
approach as a faithful implementation of Leegin itself. These scholars 
claim that full-blown rule of reason scrutiny will almost never result 
in condemnation of such restraints, contrary to Leegin’s assumption 
that such restraints sometimes result in harm.293 Second, some also 
286. Id. at 35-37. 
 287. Id.
288. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(condemning price restraint under “quick look” analysis because the defendants could have 
achieved the same benefits by means of a less restrictive alternative). 
289. See Lambert, supra note 148, passim (reviewing various possible approaches to 
rule of reason scrutiny of minimum RPM and offering an alternative structured approach); 
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as 
Prepared for the National Association of Attorneys General: Antitrust Federalism: Enhanc-
ing Federal/State Cooperation 7-15 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/speeches/250635.pdf (articulating post-Leegin structured rule of reason analysis). 
 290. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 148, at 1997-2001. 
291. Id. at 1971-72. See also Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
895-96 (2007) (stating that pricing effects alone do not establish anticompetitive effect). 
292. See Amended States’ Comments Urging Denial of Nine West’s Petition, supra note 
230, at 9; Petition of Nine West Footwear Corp. to Reopen and Modify Order at 2-4, In re
Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://ftc.gov/ 
os/comments/ninewestgrp/071206aai.pdf (letter by the American Antitrust Institute urging 
the FTC to deny Nine West Group’s Petition to Reopen and Modify Order); Grimes, supra 
note 223, at 492-94; Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 423; Lao, supra note 164, at 84-85; Pitof-
sky, supra note 183, at 65 (endorsing a “quick look” approach to minimum RPM as a “com-
promise” between per se condemnation and full-blown rule of reason analysis). 
293. See Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 423 (advocating a “quick look” with safe harbors 
as the best implementation of Leegin’s principles for similar reasons); Lao, supra note 164, 
at 84 (“[I]n real-world antitrust litigation, a full-blown rule of reason analysis often oper-
ates as a de facto legality rule, which even the Leegin Court did not favor.”). See also Mi-
2013] ASSORTED ANTI-LEEGIN CANARDS 959
argue from first principles that the “quick look” is the optimal meth-
odology for assessing minimum RPM, given the nature of such re-
straints, their (alleged) probable anticompetitive harm, the sparse 
empirical evidence of benefits, and the ready availability of less      
restrictive alternatives.294
 Neither argument, either alone or in combination, justifies appli-
cation of the “quick look” to minimum RPM. For one thing, the Leegin
Court was fully aware of the “quick look” option. At least two amicus 
briefs advocated such an approach.295 However, while the Court ex-
pressly relied on other amicus briefs, it did not mention or otherwise 
endorse the “quick look.”296 Moreover, the Court did not stipulate that 
the rule of reason as applied to minimum RPM should condemn any 
particular proportion of challenged agreements. Assertions to the 
contrary are strange, given the admitted paucity of evidence about 
the impact of minimum RPM in the real world.297 Instead, the Court 
simply stated that there were “risks of unlawful conduct” and that 
the “potential anticompetitive consequences of [minimum RPM] must 
not be ignored . . . .”298 The Court could not have known how many 
firms would in fact adopt harmful minimum RPM despite the deter-
rent effect of the rule of reason and resulting private and public liti-
gation. Any assertion on this point would have been speculation and 
thus dicta at best.  
 Leegin’s refusal to endorse a “quick look” for minimum RPM is not 
surprising as a matter of antitrust principle. Courts have articulated 
varying tests for identifying restraints that are inherently suspect, 
and minimum RPM does not satisfy any such test. For instance, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that a restraint is inherently suspect 
when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of eco-
nomics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have 
chael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2009) (reporting that from 1977 to 1999, plaintiffs’ failure to 
demonstrate significant anticompetitive effects resulted in dismissal in eighty-four percent 
of litigated rule of reason cases, and that this figure increased to ninety-seven percent a 
decade later). 
294. See Petition of Nine West Footwear Corp. to Reopen and Modify Order, supra note 
292, at 2-4; Grimes, supra note 223, at 492-93; Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 463-72. See 
also Pitofsky, supra note 183, at 65 (suggesting, before Leegin, that the Supreme Court 
adopt a “quick look” approach to minimum RPM if it credits arguments that such contracts 
can sometimes reduce free riding). 
 295. Brief for Anderson Economic Group, LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ent, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480); 
Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (contending 
that minimum RPM should remain unlawful per se but that, in the alternative, courts 
should employ a “quick look” approach). 
296. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889 (citing three different amicus briefs). 
297. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.  
298. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894. 
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an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”299 More recent-
ly the D.C. Circuit put the test in three alternative ways, stating that 
a restraint is inherently suspect if: (1) “it is obvious from the nature 
of the challenged conduct that it will likely harm consumers,”300 (2) 
“judicial experience and economic learning have shown [such re-
straints] to be likely to harm consumers,”301 or (3) there is a “close 
family resemblance between the suspect practice and another prac-
tice that already stands convicted in the court of consumer welfare” 
[i.e., is unlawful per se].302
 Minimum RPM does not satisfy any such test. For instance, an 
observer with “even” a rudimentary knowledge of economics would 
presumably understand the basic tenets of TCE, its recognition that 
markets sometimes fail, and Telser’s 1960 insight that minimum 
RPM can overcome such market failure.303 For similar reasons, one 
cannot say that it is “obvious” that minimum RPM will likely harm 
consumers. Moreover, as explained earlier, the per se rule has itself 
prevented economists from learning about the practice and courts 
from gaining judicial experience with it.304 Finally, TCE exploded Dr.
Miles’s assumption that there is a close family resemblance between 
minimum RPM and naked horizontal price fixing.305 It is no surprise, 
then, that various scholars and enforcement agencies have rejected 
“quick look” treatment for minimum RPM.306
 To be sure, and as “quick look” proponents point out, a require-
ment that plaintiffs prove actual anticompetitive harm or conditions 
299. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
300. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
301. Id. at 36-37. 
302. Id. at 37. 
 303. Indeed, one of Leegin’s detractors has claimed that the “free rider” argument “is 
all Economics 101 theory.” Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 7 (state-
ment of Robert Pitofsky). Some may nonetheless assert that “rudimentary” knowledge ex-
cludes TCE, which has supplanted the basic price theory that once encouraged hostile 
treatment of non-standard contracts. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the context suggests otherwise. In particular, the Court’s qualification of the term 
“rudimentary” with “even” connotes that anyone, including the most sophisticated econo-
mists, would conclude that the challenged practice is harmful. Indeed, after announcing 
this standard the Court ruled, after reviewing sophisticated economic literature, that the 
challenged horizontal agreements limiting advertising, while normally unlawful per se,
were not inherently suspect. See California Dental, 526 U.S. at 771-73. 
304. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra Part VI.  
306. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 285 n.45 (“[V]ertical nonprice restraints are 
never subjected to ‘quick look’ analysis.”); id. at 538-39 (endorsing structured rule of reason 
for both price and non-price vertical restraints, imposing upon the plaintiff a burden of 
proving harm or circumstances suggesting such harm); Lambert, supra note 148, at 1971-
72. See also Order Granting in Part Petition to Reopen and Modify Order Issued April 11, 
2000, In re Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/080506order.pdf (modifying previous order banning 
minimum RPM given the absence of evidence of actual competitive harm); Varney, supra 
note 289, at 7-15 (articulating post-Leegin structured rule of reason analysis). 
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conducive to such harm will be more burdensome than a presumption 
that such harm exists.307 In particular, these proponents contend that 
proof that manufacturers possess market power is particularly ex-
pensive.308 However, this burden will be no greater than the burden 
that antitrust law routinely imposes on plaintiffs in a variety of con-
texts. For instance, plaintiffs alleging “monopolization” contrary to 
Section 2 must prove a relevant market and the defendant’s share of 
that market.309 Plaintiffs challenging a merger must prove the rele-
vant market in which the transaction will supposedly lessen competi-
tion and prove the market shares of various participants in the in-
dustry.310 Plaintiffs contending that a tying contract is unlawful per
se under Section 1 must allege and prove that the defendant has eco-
nomic power.311 In each instance failure to prove such a market 
dooms the plaintiff’s case.312 Plaintiffs do, in fact, sometimes succeed 
in proving such markets.313
 Proponents of a “quick look” for minimum RPM may respond by 
claiming that these practices pose smaller competitive risks than 
minimum RPM. This is pure conjecture. As explained earlier, Lee-
gin’s detractors have not established that minimum RPM usually re-
duces economic welfare. The evidence they have offered—higher pric-
es during the fair trade era—is equally consistent with TCE’s 
presumption that the practice overcomes a market failure.314 Indeed, 
Leegin’s detractors lack the courage of their convictions. If minimum 
307. See, e.g., Kirkwood, supra note 156, at 457-59 (explaining why this requirement is 
“[t]he biggest hurdle facing a plaintiff under the full rule of reason” for minimum RPM). 
308. Id. at 458-59. 
309. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480-81 (1992) 
(citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). 
310. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357, 362 (1963). 
311. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-64. 
312. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s per se tying claim because the defendant lacked economic power); United States 
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 404 (1956) (rejecting the govern-
ment’s proposed market definition and, thus, the claim that the defendant possessed mo-
nopoly power sufficient for a Section 2 claim); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 
2d 1098, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting merger challenge because the plaintiff failed to 
prove its proffered relevant product market). 
313. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451, passim (rejecting defendant’s effort to un-
dermine plaintiff’s proof of market power for Section 2 and tying purposes); Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604-05 (1985) (affirming the jury’s find-
ing that defendant violated Section 2); FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1032 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming injunction against challenged merger after accepting plaintiff’s 
proposed market definition); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 44-46 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (per curiam) (holding that Microsoft violated Section 2 by monopolizing the market 
for “Intel-based PC Operating Systems”); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 711 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting 
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction preventing proposed merger after embracing 
plaintiff’s proposed market definition); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 
(D.D.C. 1997) (same). 
314. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text. 
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RPM really is harmful in a higher proportion of cases than other 
practices, presumably plaintiffs, including federal and state enforc-
ers, will be able to make such harm apparent to courts.315 Moreover, 
if plaintiffs do prevail in a significant proportion of such cases, 
courts, having gained additional experience with minimum RPM, can 
depart from the ordinary rule of reason framework at that time.316
However, immediate application of a “quick look” rule of reason 
would contravene both TCE and the standards governing which re-
straints are inherently suspect. 
F.   Leegin Did Not Contravene Stare Decisis
 Several of those who resist Leegin contend that stare decisis re-
quired adherence to Dr. Miles, even if the Supreme Court believed 
the decision to be incorrect in light of new information.317 In fact, this 
assertion appeared in a finding in legislation proposed in 2011.318
These detractors repeat many of the arguments made by Justice 
Breyer, who devoted much of his lengthy dissent to criticism of the 
majority’s approach to stare decisis.319 Like Justice Breyer, these 
scholars and advocates are incorrect. 
 The invocation of stare decisis by Leegin’s opponents is supremely 
ironic contravening, as it does, previous case law that expressly ad-
dressed the role of precedent in the antitrust context. For instance, in 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Court addressed a three-decades-old prec-
edent declaring maximum RPM unlawful per se.320 After determining 
that per se condemnation was no longer consistent with sound eco-
nomic reasoning, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice 
O’Connor, went on to determine whether the doctrine of stare decisis
315. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM.
ECON. REV. 105, 113 (1969) (contending that recognition of relevance of efficiencies in mer-
ger analysis will lead parties and enforcement agencies to develop new techniques for as-
certaining and measuring such effects). 
316. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (suggesting that experience 
derived from thorough rule of reason analyses can convince courts that restraints should be 
subject to “quick look” instead). 
317. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 183, at 27-28 (arguing that the Leegin Court 
“failed to give appropriate weight to . . . stare decisis”); Harbour, supra note 164, at 45 
(“The Court should have been very reluctant to change a longstanding rule of law in re-
sponse to theoretical economic assumptions, especially when these assumptions lack rigor-
ous and valid empirical support.”); Lance McMillian, The Proper Role of Courts: The Mis-
takes of the Supreme Court In Leegin, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 405, 408. See also Brief of the 
American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5-10, Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (contending 
that demands of stare decisis are more powerful in the antitrust context than with respect 
to other statutes). 
318. See S. 75, 112th Cong. §2(a)(5) (2011) (asserting that Leegin “improperly disre-
garded 96 years of antitrust law precedent”).  
319. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 320. 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997). In Khan, the Court overruled Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 
145 (1968), which had declared maximum RPM unlawful per se.
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nonetheless compelled adherence to a wealth-destroying rule.321 Jus-
tice O’Connor acknowledged that stare decisis generally has greater 
force in the statutory context and that Congress, and not the courts, 
should revise erroneous interpretations of statutes.322 Still, invoking 
several precedents, she explained that stare decisis has less force in 
the antitrust context.323 Her reasoning is worth quoting in full: 
But “[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command.” In the ar-
ea of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well represented 
in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed 
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience. Thus, 
the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to 
Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of 
the accepted view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape 
to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradi-
tion.” As we have explained, the term “restraint of trade,” as used 
in §1, also “invokes the common law itself, and not merely the stat-
ic content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.” 
Accordingly, this Court has reconsidered its decisions construing 
the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those de-
cisions are called into serious question.324
 This unanimous account of antitrust stare decisis, which Justice 
Breyer joined at the time, was not novel. Ten years earlier, the Court 
had, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, opined that “[t]he Sherman Act 
adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. 
It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content 
that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”325 Ten years 
before that, a unanimous opinion by Justice Stevens concluded that 
Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad 
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”326 Several other deci-
sions, including of course Sylvania, have adjusted or repudiated prior 
decisions in light of new understandings about the economic impact 
of challenged practices.327 Each of these decisions contradicts asser-
321. See id. at 20-21. 
 322. Id.
 323. Id.
324. Id. (citations omitted).
 325. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). 
 326. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“Congress, 
however, did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the 
statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly 
clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on 
common-law tradition. The Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law precedents long 
antedating the Sherman Act, has served that purpose. It has been used to give the Act both 
flexibility and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has remained con-
stant.”).
327. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (rejecting pre-
vious decisions holding that possession of a patent confers economic power for purposes of 
tying doctrine); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (repu-
964 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW      [Vol. 40:907 
tions by Justice Breyer and others that courts should treat Sherman 
Act precedents like other statutory precedents, requiring a particu-
larly strong justification before courts can overrule a prior decision.328
If anything, the case for overruling Dr. Miles was stronger than was 
the case for departing from precedent in Khan. After all, TCE did 
more than simply call the “theoretical underpinnings” of Dr. Miles in-
to “serious question.”329 Instead, TCE obliterated the central econom-
ic premise of Dr. Miles, namely, that vertically-imposed RPM is 
equivalent to a horizontal cartel between dealers.330 True respect for 
stare decisis includes respect for those decisions that have repeatedly 
held that precedent has less force in the Sherman Act context. 
 Any other approach to stare decisis would contravene Standard
Oil’s century-old construction of the term “restraint of trade.”331 As 
the Court explained, Congress did not invent the term “restraint of 
trade,” but instead took the term from the common law.332 Moreover, 
the term “restraint of trade” as employed at common law did not re-
fer to a particular, unchanging list of agreements, but instead re-
ferred to agreements that courts believed produced particular conse-
quences.333 Thus, agreements that were unenforceable during the 
fifteenth century because courts believed them to be harmful became 
enforceable in the early eighteenth century as judges revised their 
understandings of their consequences.334 As the Supreme Court ex-
plained one year before the Sherman Act, an earlier rule defining 
“restraint of trade” “was made under a condition of things, and a 
state of society, different from those which now prevail [and] the rule 
diating doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy contained in prior decisions); Jefferson Par-
ish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (rejecting the prior approach to de-
fining “economic power” for purposes of tying doctrine); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (rejecting a per se ban on non-price vertical restraints); FTC v. 
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (repudiating a 1920 decision articulating the meaning 
of “unfair competition” under the Federal Trade Commission Act).  
 328. Justice Breyer attempted to distinguish Khan on the ground that the decision that 
it overruled was a mere twenty-nine years old, “nowhere close to the century Dr. Miles has 
stood.” See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 927 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Putting aside the fact that more than forty states accepted Con-
gress’s invitation to reject Dr. Miles during the fair trade era, the longevity of a precedent 
does not immunize it from subsequent theoretical developments. After all, the outright ban 
on trade restraints, first announced in the fifteenth century, survived for three centuries, 
only to be overruled by judicial fiat. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. 
329. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997). 
330. See supra notes 130-38, 141, 145 and accompanying text. 
 331. See 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). See also Meese, supra note 13, at 786-87 (explaining 
that modern jurists and scholars uniformly embrace Standard Oil). 
332. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 50-51.  
333. Id. at 58-59. 
334. Id. at 51, 56-59 (describing this evolution with approval); United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-81 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211 
(1899). 
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laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has been considerably modi-
fied.”335 Several nineteenth-century state court opinions concurred.336
 Standard Oil described this dynamic, common law approach with 
approval when articulating the meaning of the statute.337 Like the 
common law, the Court said, the term “restraint of trade” did not 
freeze into place the list of agreements deemed unenforceable in 
1890.338 Instead, the term empowered courts to ban all contracts, in-
cluding those unknown in 1890, that offended the public policy con-
tained in the Act because they “produce[d] the consequences of mo-
nopoly.”339 To determine whether a challenged arrangement had the 
prohibited effect, the Court said, judges should apply their “rea-
son.”340 Thus, as Robert Bork explained over four decades ago, “[t]he 
rules implied by the policy [that animates the rule of reason] are al-
terable as economic analysis progresses.”341 Finally, as explained ear-
lier, Standard Oil approved the common law practice of altering doc-
trine in light of “more accurate economic conceptions . . . .”342
 To pile irony on top of irony, Dr. Miles itself embraced a dynamic 
approach to the term “restraint of trade.” After all, at common law, 
minimum RPM was not automatically unlawful or unenforceable. In-
deed, just one year before Congress passed the Sherman Act, the Su-
preme Court, in Fowle v. Park, a case premised upon diversity of citi-
zenship, enforced as reasonable an agreement setting minimum 
resale prices of patent medicine.343 William Howard Taft would cite 
this opinion with approval in his monumental Addyston Pipe deci-
sion, describing the challenged agreement as “ancillary to the main 
and lawful purpose of the contract, and . . . necessary to the protec-
tion of the covenantee in the carrying out of that main purpose.”344
Moreover, some state courts enforced minimum RPM agreements af-
335. See Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889). 
336. See, e.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22 (N.Y. 1887) (endors-
ing modification of the common law of trade restraints in light of changed circumstances); 
Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1880) (“It is not that con-
tracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or enforceable now than they were at any 
former period, but that the courts look differently at the question as to what is a restraint 
of trade.”); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-41 (Wis. 1851) (same). 
337. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51-59. 
338. Id. at 58-59; Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 47-48 (1966). 
339. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55-57, 64. 
340. Id. at 63-64 (stating that courts should employ “the light of reason” to determine 
whether a challenged agreement offends the “public policy embodied in the statute”). 
341. See Bork, supra note 338, at 47-48. 
342. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55; see id. at 59. 
 343. 131 U.S. 88 (1889). 
344. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as 
modified by 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
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ter passage of the Sherman Act and before Dr. Miles, sometimes rely-
ing upon Fowle.345
 Perhaps Standard Oil, Dr. Miles, and various more recent deci-
sions embraced an incorrect approach to stare decisis.346 Perhaps the 
1890 Congress that passed the Sherman Act expected that courts 
would simply adhere to their own precedents indefinitely, no matter 
how much subsequent learning and doctrinal developments under-
mined the factual premises of such decisions. However, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly taken a different approach. One cannot invoke 
stare decisis as a rationale for steadfast adherence to Dr. Miles, no
matter how wrong, while simultaneously abandoning numerous oth-
er precedents that require the Court to jettison decisions whose fac-
tual premises have proven false. 
X. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: WHY RESISTANCE IS BOTH
MISGUIDED AND FUTILE
 The rule of reason requires courts to discern whether challenged 
conduct will produce monopoly or its consequences. Courts perform-
ing this role must rely upon what Standard Oil called “accurate eco-
nomic conceptions” when articulating antitrust doctrine.347 An anti-
trust regime that ignored theoretical developments would not be 
based on “reason.” 
Dr. Miles and subsequent bans on non-price restraints rested up-
on the best theory courts could muster, theory that equated vertical 
restraints on dealers with analogous naked horizontal agreements 
between dealers. TCE, however, exploded this assumption, demon-
strating that vertical restraints can reduce the cost of transacting by 
minimizing market failures. Leegin’s detractors have failed to offer a 
convincing alternative rationale for a per se ban on minimum RPM. 
Instead, these detractors have advanced arguments that question 
TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both. 
 Nothing prevents Congress or the states from ignoring advances 
in economic learning and banning conduct that often creates wealth. 
The rule of reason binds federal courts, not Congress or the states. 
However, restoration of Dr. Miles would not be a “correction” of Lee-
gin. To be sure, reimposition of Dr. Miles would make some markets 
345. See, e.g., Grogan v. Chafee, 105 P. 745, 747 (Cal. 1909) (invoking Fowle); Garst v. 
Harris, 58 N.E. 174, 174 (Mass. 1900) (same); John D. Park & Sons v. Nat’l Wholesale 
Druggists’ Ass’n, 67 N.E. 136, 141 (N.Y. 1903) (Parker, C.J., concurring) (same). See also 
Garst v. Charles, 72 N.E. 839, 840 (Mass. 1905) (enforcing such an agreement without in-
voking Fowle).
346. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (detailing various decisions holding 
that courts may reverse prior decisions in light of changed economic understandings). 
 347.  Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 54. 
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appear more “competitive.”348 However, competition for its own sake 
has never been the objective of the Sherman Act; some limitations on 
rivalry improve market outcomes and thus economic welfare.349 Re-
imposition of Dr. Miles would create antitrust doctrine divorced from 
the very economic theory that Congress expected courts to apply in 
fashioning antitrust doctrine. At the same time, it seems unlikely 
that reimposition of a per se ban on minimum RPM would induce the 
Supreme Court to abandon decisions like Sylvania and its progeny. 
The result would therefore be an arbitrary distinction between price 
and non-price restraints, encouraging parties to elect non-price re-
straints for reasons unrelated to wealth creation. 
 Thus, such a restoration of Dr. Miles would operate as an exemp-
tion from basic antitrust principles, preventing firms from adopting 
ordinary competitive practices that improve the competitive process. 
Like other antitrust exemptions, the resulting rule would potentially 
advantage some rent-seeking participants in the legislative process, 
particularly no-frills retailers and manufacturers with established 
brands, at the expense of others, such as smaller, innovative manu-
facturers hoping to break into the market by inducing established 
dealers to stock their products.350 Perhaps the closest analogy to such 
an exemption can be found in the Robinson-Patman Act, which, as 
explained earlier, deterred large, efficient chains from obtaining vol-
ume discounts that could ultimately benefit consumers.351
 In any event, state or Congressional nullification of Leegin will not 
be the “last word” on minimum RPM. Statutory exemptions from the 
Sherman Act are read narrowly, “with beady eyes and green eye-
shades,” to minimize the impact of special interest influence in the 
legislative process.352 Proponents of “reason” will still have many 
348. Cf. S. 75, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2011) (finding that Leegin “substantially harms 
the ability of [some discounters] to compete”).
349. See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text. 
350. See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 165-66 (contending that availability 
of effective promotional strategies can enhance incentives to innovate). Cf. S. 75, 112th 
Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2011) (finding that repeal of Leegin will advantage discounters). See also 
supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (explaining how minimum RPM can facilitate 
entry by upstart manufacturers). 
351. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 156, at 312 (The Report 
treated the Robinson-Patman Act as an exception to free market competition because “[t]he 
Act is fundamentally inconsistent with the antitrust laws and harms consumer welfare. It 
is not possible to reconcile the provisions of the Act with the purpose of antitrust law.”). See 
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 711 
(1982) (“The Robinson-Patman Act is a small-business protection statute . . . .”). 
352. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“Special interest laws do not have ‘spirits,’ and it is inappropriate to extend them to 
achieve more of the objective [than] the lobbyists wanted. . . . Recognition that special in-
terest legislation enshrines results rather than principles is why courts read exceptions to 
the antitrust laws narrowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades.”). See also Union Labor 
Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982) (“[E]xemptions from the antitrust laws 
must be construed narrowly.”). 
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weapons at their disposal to mitigate the harmful impact of any codi-
fication of Dr. Miles.
  For instance, federal enforcement agencies, which once simply de-
clined to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act, may decline to challenge 
reasonable instances of minimum RPM, thereby replicating Leegin as 
a matter of enforcement policy.353 While private parties could still in-
voke a revitalized Dr. Miles, courts could minimize the impact of such 
“private attorneys general.” In particular, courts could invoke the 
doctrine of in pari delicto, which prevents parties from challenging 
an agreement they have voluntarily entered.354 While the Court 
waived this doctrine in the dealer-supplier context during the inhos-
pitality era by claiming that such agreements are involuntary,355
TCE demonstrates that such agreements can be voluntary efforts to 
minimize transaction costs.356 Moreover, even if such suits proceed, 
plaintiffs would not be home free; the doctrine of antitrust injury lim-
its private recoveries to those damages that flow from the anticom-
petitive impact, if any, of the challenged restraint.357 Thus, a termi-
nated dealer could not, for instance, recover profits lost because 
minimum RPM prevented it from free riding on the promotional ef-
forts of other dealers, given that the prevention of free riding is not a 
harmful impact of minimum RPM.358 As a result, even if Congress 
codifies the per se rule, courts can bar private challenges to efficient 
minimum RPM by finding that such agreements are voluntary or, in 
the alternative, limit the damages that aggrieved dealers can recov-
er.359 State courts could invoke similar reasoning to block private 
suits under their own antitrust statutes. 
 What, though, about the merits of such litigation? Armed with the 
authority to read exemptions narrowly, courts can minimize the im-
pact of a legislative ban on minimum RPM in a number of ways. 
First, courts can read the agency and consignment exceptions to the 
per se rule broadly, allowing firms to circumvent any per se ban by 
altering the form of the transaction between manufacturer and deal-
353. See Easterbrook, supra note 351, at 710-11 (approving the Carter Administration’s 
refusal to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act). 
354. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1995) (invoking the doctrine 
to bar a challenge to a contract to which the plaintiff was a party). 
 355. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1968). 
356. See Meese, supra note 88 (explaining how TCE implies that parties enter efficient 
non-standard contracts voluntarily). 
357. See generally Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (holding 
that a dealer challenging maximum RPM imposed on rivals could not recover damages re-
sulting from above-cost and thus procompetitive pricing). 
358. See id. at 335-40; Isaksen v. Vt. Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that terminated dealer could not recover profits it expected to derive from free rid-
ing off the efforts of full service retailers). 
359. See Blackburn, 53 F.3d at 829-30 (holding that the doctrine of in pari delicto 
barred suit when both sides were equally responsible for the restraint). 
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er.360 Moreover, courts can strengthen the Colgate exception, refusing 
to condemn agreements absent an explicit agreement between manu-
facturer and dealer.361 Finally, courts can read any such legislation so 
as not to penalize an agreement between a manufacturer and one 
dealer to terminate another, price-cutting dealer.362
 To be sure, state courts are not bound to employ “reason.” Moreo-
ver, such courts do not “internalize” the full impact of doctrine they 
generate, which, like commerce itself, may stretch across state 
lines.363 Thus, these tribunals may be less willing to adopt the sort of 
doctrinal strategies necessary to minimize the impact of a (state-
level) ban on minimum RPM. Nonetheless, states that adopt such 
wealth-destroying rules will do so at their own peril. For one thing, 
manufacturers can avoid the impact of a state ban on minimum RPM 
by terminating dealers in the state and integrating forward into dis-
tribution or simply withdrawing from the jurisdiction altogether.364
Moreover, such a ban could deprive a state’s citizens of the benefits of 
additional interbrand competition in those industries where mini-
mum RPM is necessary to induce entry-facilitating promotion.365 Fi-
nally, airtight bans on minimum RPM may simply force manufactur-
ers to employ more costly alternative means of inducing promotion, 
thereby increasing consumer prices.366 Indeed, these considerations 
may explain why more state legislatures have not responded to Lee-
gin and why one state legislature recently rejected its own supreme 
court’s effort to ban minimum RPM.367
360. See, e.g., Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 
1989) (finding that the airline’s price fixing agreement with travel agent did not offend Dr. 
Miles). But see Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (opining that 
sham agency agreements designed solely to circumvent Dr. Miles were void).
361. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
362. See generally Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding 
that such agreements are properly analyzed under a full-blown rule of reason). 
363. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231-32 (1899) (find-
ing that the Sherman Act reached multistate cartel agreements because, absent federal 
regulation, each state might adopt rules that served “its own particular interest”). 
364. See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 356 n.39 (1985) (reporting termination of all 642 Jack-in-
the-Box franchisees after a class action settlement prohibited the use of quality control ty-
ing contracts). Cf. William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 311-15 (1997) (explaining how a state that imposes oner-
ous law on foreign corporations may drive investment from the jurisdiction).  
365. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (explaining how minimum RPM 
can facilitate new entry). 
366. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 902 (2007).  
    367. See PLC Antitrust, Kansas Law Reverses Kansas Supreme Court Decision on Re-
sale Price Maintenance, PRACTICAL LAW CO. (Apr. 19, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/2-
525-9093. For a summary of the legislation, see Kansas Restraint of Trade Act—
Harmonization; Reasonable Restraints; Exceptions; Damages; SB 124, KAN. LEGIS.
RESEARCH DEP’T., http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/documents/summary 
_sb_124_2013.pdf. 
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 In short, a per se ban on minimum RPM would contravene the 
very economic theory that Congress expected courts to apply when 
fashioning antitrust doctrine. While legislatures are free to impose 
such rules, they should not be surprised if enforcers and courts seek 
to minimize the harm from such a departure from “reason.” Re-
sistance to Leegin may thus be more than misguided. It may also     
be futile. 
